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INTRODLJCT ION
Ashok V. Desai
Coordinator, Energy Research Group
P.O. Box 8500, Ottawa, Ont., Canada
All energy resources (including such widely diffused ones as solar
and wind energy) show great regional variations in availability and exer-
cise a localizing influence on economic activities based on them. The
lower their cost and the lower their transportability, the greater is
their localizing influence. Oil is eminently transportable; its refined
products fuel vehicles that can be considerably miniaturized; and, in the
quarter century following World War II, it became progressively cheaper.
As a result, oil proved a powerful force in the diffusion of economic
growth, and in the industrialization of developing countries. The sharp
increases in its cost in the past 10 years have, by contrast, jeopardized
the growth of a large number of developing countries and brought some of
them to the verge of bankruptcy.
Questions regarding the future of' oil supply and prices are there-
fore of great relevance to developing countries arid to the work of the
Energy Research Group, who8e task is to review the energy problems of
developing countries and to assess the adequacy or inadequacy of the
research and technology available to solve the problems. For this rea-
son, three eminent experts on the oil question were asked to give their
views on the prospects of oil. Their papers, presented at the Energy
Research Priorities Seminar held on 8-10 August 1983 at the International
Development Research Centre, Ottawa, are put together here.
Mr D.C. Ion summarizes the best available estimates of oil and gas
reserves and output. On oil demand, he is more tentative, which is not
surprising in view of the strongly lagged and unsteady response world oil
demand has shown to price changes. On the future course of oil price, he
points out that the number of major oil exporters is likely to shrink as
time passes and the proportion of Saudi Arabia's exports in the OPEC
total is likely to rise, giving that country increasing influence on the
price.
Professor Peter Odell deals altogether more forthrightly with
demand, which in his view is so price-elastic that different price
regimes can give vastly different rates of oil exhaustion. As he points
out, the marginal cost of producing oil must increase with the proportion
of world oil resources that is exhausted, and hence its course over time
must depend on the rate of exhaustion of oil. The higher the price of
oil, the lower will be its demand, the slower the rate of its exhaustion,
and the lower its marginal cost at a given time in the future.
So much is straightforward economics. Professor OdelJ.'s views,
which were once sensational and are even now controversial, relate to the
oil resource base. His figure of oil reserves is little different from
-- and indeed lower than -- Mr Ion's. However, in his -- basically
reasonable -- view, these are not the ultimate oil reserves, which must
depend on, and increase up to a point with, investment in exploration and
technology. The knç,wn reserves (including tose used up) are of the
order of 1600 x 1O barrels, and 2000 x 10 barrels is the minimum
magnitude of ultimate reserves of low-cost, conventional oil. Professor
Odll takes a likely estimate of 3000 x i09 barrels and another 2000 x
10 barrels of high-cost oil, and obtains consumption curves that show
oil lasting beyond the year 2080. Even without cepting his precise
figures, it is possible to argue that liquid fuels in various forms can
retain a significant place in development patterns and life styles for
five or ten decades, and perh8 longer.
Professor Odell shares the view of Mr Ion that oil prices are
determined by collusion between the major producing and consuming coun-
tries; in his view, they have combined to fix so high a price that the
ultimate demand for oil may fall short of the ultimate reserves and that
the oil industry may die for lack of demand. This view relies closely on
Professor Odell's impression of a high price-elasticity of demand.
Dr Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani takes a different view of oil price for-
mat ion. In his view, the world oil market is fragmented, and what is
regarded as the world price of oil is only the price of the small propor-
tion of oil exported by OPEC countries. Major consuming countries give
preference first to indigenous oil and then to oil from safe sources --
which the OPEC countries are not, in their view. Hence the demand for
OPEC oil varies more violently than total demand and so does the price of
their oil.
Between them, the three authors have clarified some of the basic
facts of the world economy, but they have also raised a nuner of issues
that call for discussion. It is to invite such discussion that these
papers are being brought out for wider circulation. The Energy Research
Group would be keenly interested in all reactions to these papers, which
it hopes will evoke a fruitful debate.
PETROLEIJI At4) TIE DEVELOPIPII C1]OIITRIES
D.C. Ion
Energy Resources Analyst and Consultant,
Bledington near Kingham,
Oxford, 0X7 6XQ, England
Introduction
The years 1973, 1979, and 1983 are three important dates in the continu-.
ing saga of the petroleum industry's uncertainty that replaced the relative
stability of the late 1950s and 1960s, after the industry had weathered the
"shock" of the temporary 1088 of oil supplies from Iran in the early 1950s.
Rising world demand determined world supply before the 1973 oil shock, and
only some oilmen (Bridgeman 1963) appreciated that because the oil resource
was finite it could not sustain an exponential growth in demand for very long.
The oil shock of 1973 was, first, the interruption of supplies to some
countries on the decision of the Arab Oil Ministers, followed by the rise in
price8 by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This
burst the popular euphoric bubble that oil would continue to be cheap and to
be the ever-expanding world energy source. There was an immediate over-reac-
tion outside the oil industry. The producing countries soon thought that they
had proved their power and would reap the benefit of great wealth that would
put them on an equal footing with the industrialized countries, from whose
exploitation some considered that they had suffered for decades. The consum-
ing countries feared for the security of their supplies of oil on which they
had come to rely heavily. The world financial circles feared the threat to
their establishment by the switch of enormous funds into new hand8 and won-
dered how best to absorb the new "petrodollars."
The oil industry reacted first to mitigate the supply discontinuities.
This was possible because the major international companies still had their
traditional flexibility through integrated company control systems and had a
belief in the sanctity of contracts. These majors were older than all govern-
ments and most countries. Their staff had coped with many crises in many
countries. Indeed they had been so succe8sful that the world had enjoyed 20
years of stable prices and increasing supply. That critical period of late
1973 and early 1974 saw the last of the obvious stabilizing power of the
major oil companies. The increasing invervention of governments and politi-
cians, the increasing influence of bankers, investment brokers, coranodity
speculators, and the public, with its new concerns like environmentalism, have
caused a restructuring of the petroleum industry to meet these changes and the
world economic recession. The year 1973 marked the end of the era of cheap
energy. The possibility of supply interruptions stimulated exploration for
new sources outside the OPEC area, a drive for improved efficiency, and a
search for energy sources alternative to oil.
Fears for the world financial structure proved unfounded: economies
started to adjust; demand for oil started to rise and the depression to lift.
Significant amounts of oil began to develop from new sources, particularly in
Alaska and the North Sea, and the decline in USA production was halted in
1977. However, the fragility of the revival was shown by the over-reaction of
the oil industry, as well as the consuming countries, to the overthrow of the
Shah of Iran in December 1978.
Iran was producing 285 Mt/year in 1977 and supplying natural gas to the
USSR. There were schemes for supplies of gas and liquified natural gas (LNG)
to a total of some 40 x i09 in', the equivalent of another 34 Mt/year of
oil. The Shah's appreciation that oil was wasted under boilers, and that nuc-
lear energy could be an element in the energy mix even of an oil-producing
country, had given hope for the development of rational energy policies. There
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was, therefore, in December 1978 not only the loss of a major oil supply, but
the overthrow of a western type of energy system and the threat that an
Islamic revolution might disturb the whole of the Middle East.
Almost overnight, the oil market was transformed into a frantic scramble
for supplies. OPEC followed the newly developed "spot market" and found that
buyers would pay higher prices. Later, the confusion caused by the struggles
of the Khomeini regime was confounded by the Iran-Iraq war from September
1979.
Crude oil prices of Arabian Light, the OPEC marker, were some $2/US bar-
rel (ph) in 1972, jumped to almost $11 pb at the end of 1973, to $26 pb by the
end of 1979, and then up to $34 pb by the end of 1981, a price that officially
held through to early 1983.
The 1979-80 rises halted the recovery in the world economy, dealt a
heavier blow to those developing countrie8 that had little or no oil or alter-
native energy sources, encouraged energy conservation and substitutes for oil
in the industrialized countries, &id stimulated further the search for and
production af new non-OPEC oil and gas. The call on OPEC oil was markedly
reduced.
OPEC production of crude oil, plus natural gas liquid8 (MCI.), fell from
1.35 Ct in 1980 to 1.14 Ct in 1981, to 0.96 Ct in 1982, and continues to
fall. These ware falls of 15.7% and 17.5% while world production fell only 5%
to 2.75 Ct. OPEC found by March 1983 that their official price scale, based
on Arabian Light Crude at $34 ph, could not be held, because members were both
price cutting and exceeding their agreed production quotas. Supplies to the
market were augmented by reduction in stocks in anticipation of prices fall-
ing, as they did when OPEC set a new marker price of $29 pb. Spring 1983
therefore saw the first significant fall in the official OPEC crude price
since 1973. The fall was due to market forces and, though foreseen for many
months, the consequences were still unclear in May 1983.
This recapitulation of the events of the past decade is intended:
To stress the turbulence since 1973 and some of the factors that have
formed the present base from which the future must be viewed;
To give a coherent summary, while appreciating that every reader would
have told the story differently, according to his own viewpoint;
To emphasize that people often react in anticipation of events that
might otherwise never happen;
To stress the need to take a global overview, because the developing
countries cannot be considered in isolation - the term "the Third World"
implies a First and Second World, but in energy resources there is only
One World.
Nonetheless, a grouping has to be adopted for discussion and four groups
have been taken, the industrialized countries (taken as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD), the centrally planned economies
(CPE), OPEC, and the less developed, non-OPEC developing countries. This
grouping is far from ideal because, over the past decade, there has been in-
creasing differentiation within the developing countries with the growth of
the newly industrialized countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina,
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Hong Kong, and Singapore. This group already had, in 1975, a per capita
energy consumption of 1157 kg of coal equivalant (kg-ce), compared with the
98 kg-ce for the other developing countries and 5016 kg-ce for the industrial-
ized old countries (Gordon 1980). Saudi Arabia claims that it will have semi-
industrialized status by 1985 when its steel and petrochemical projects come
on stream, and the manufacturing share of Gross National Product (GNP) will be
55%.
Four aspects of the problem of petroleum availability will now be dis-
cussed: supplies of conventional petroleum; supplies of nonconventional petro-
leum; the demand and need for oil and gas in the energy mix; and oil resources
and oil prices as illustrative of the scenario that emerges.
Availthility Of Petroleii Suppliem
Crude oil
The best known sector of the world's petroleum resources is the Proved
Reserves of crude oil: at the end of 1982, these amounted to some 32 times
the 1982 production. These Proved Reserves are supported by Unproved Re-
serves, both Probable and Possible, and by Speculative Reserves, and all three
add up to the Ultimate Potential Recovery, which is perhaps, after deducting
past production, 85 times 1982 production.
Ultimate Potential Recovery is a concept that is often estimated and
always controversial. There is no doubt that increasing effort will be re-
quired to discover and prove the great amount of oil and that that exists but
geological concepts change and engineering capabilities improve. The implica-
tions of the movements of the plates now considered to form the continents are
not fully known. The latest depth record of water above a drilled well is
some 1714 a, whereas 200 m was taken as the limit only 25 years ago.
In recent years, there have been many descriptions of prospects of non-
OPEC developing countries, in many journals and books, and there has been
marked increase in exploration activity since the middle 196Dm in many coun-
tries. There have also, perhaps unfortunately, been some estimates based on
drilling density comparisons that have not given due weight to the infinite
variety of nature and the undoubted differences in richness of different
basins. Such suggestions can mislead by raising unjustifiable hopes of
instant riches. Similarly, the attribution of lack of exploratory effort and
low resource estimates to Machiavellian motives of the major oil companies
really only allow some countries to set up a scapegoat and forget that it was
their own nationalist policies that precluded exploration by the technically
and financially equipped foreign oil companies and resulted in their present
position with unknown and undiscovered oil resources. These resources are
indeed unknown in many instances and their future potential estimates are pure
guesses.
However, current Proved Reserves data are adequate for discussion of the
short- and medium-term future. Proved Reserves may be defined (Study Group
Report, World Petroleum Congress, 1983, London) as:
The estimated quantities, as at a specific date, which analysis of geo-
logical and engineering data demonstrate, with reasonable certainty to
be recoverable from known reservoirs under the economic and operational
conditions at the same date.
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The definition indicates that judgement is involved. That judgement may
be affected by pride, prejudice, and politics. Hence even the best known re-
serves category can only be an estimated aggregation of data hopefully close
enough in calculation to be a valid discussion entity. The reiteration of the
date in the definition emphasizes that reduction by production and additions
by development are constant dynamic elements in all such estimates.
Table 1 gives the position of Proved Reserves of crude oil at end 1982,
production in 1982, and consumption in 1981 (sic), on both a geographical and
political basis.
The problem with world oil reserves is less their totality than their
maldistribution through distance from the main industrial markets, which were
based originally on indigenous coal. OPEC dominates with 67% of the world
Proved Reserves and of this, geographically, 82% are in the Middle East, so
that the Middle East dominates with 55% of the total world - Saudi Arabia,
having 44% of the Middle East reserves, has 25% of the world's. In Latin
America, the bulk of the 11 Ct Proved Reserves are the 6.6 Ct in Mexico and 3
Ct in Venezuela. Mexico also has 6.6 Ct of the 10 Ct of the Less Developed
Countries (LDCs) outside OPEC.
The weight of the Middle East Proved Reserves in giant fields with pro-
lific and low-cost producing wells is a factor of great power, whether used
within the framework of OPEC or by Saudi Arabia alone.
Table 1. World Proved crude oil Re8ervea (end of 1982),
Production (1982), wid Consiption (1981)
Proved Reserves Production Consumption
Ct % Mt/year % Mt/year %
Geographic
North America 5 5 494 19 825 28
Latin America 11 12 305 11 228 8
Western Europe 3 3 141 5 630 22
Eastern Europe and USSR 9 10 632 24 546 19
Africa 8 9 222 8 76 3
Middle East 51 55 632 24 85 3
Asia 5 6 232 9 512 18
Political
QECO 8 9 654 25 1700 59
CPE 12 13 732 28)
OPEC 62 67 929 35 648 22
LDCs outside OPEC 10 11 335 12 554 19
WORLD 92 100 2650 100 2902 100
Source: Oil and Gas Journal, 27 December 1982.
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Table 2 shows the OPEC Proved Reserves, Potential Productive Capaci-
ty, and population by member countrie8. The disparity between members is
important. The oil reserves range from 22 Ct to 0.06 Ct, but population
ranges in a very different order from the 129 million people in Indonesia
to the 0.2 million in Qatar. These difference8 lead to problems of recon-
ciliation of national aims among OPEC members, while in the Middle East
political rivalries are not confined to the current overt war between Iran
and Iraq.
Table 2. OPEC Proved oil Reservea (end of 1982), Potential Productive
Caeity, ad Population (1974)
Potential productive capacity -- US Department of Energy Study
1982 (Petroleum Economist, London, UK, February 1983); Popula-
tion -- "The World in Figures," The Economist, London U.K.,
1976 (values rounded up).
Column 2 of Table 2 gives the estimated of potential production, base
on 1979 data and given in a 1982 US Department of Energy study. Dr. Taher,
Governor of the General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (PETROMIN) of
Saudi Arabia, gave a potential of 600 Mt/year for Saudi Arabia (Taher 1982)
and continued that figure through the year 2000 in his optimistic scenario
that reflects cooperation between oil producers and consumers, although hi8
total OPEC production fell from 1700 to 1300 Mt/year in 2000 -- so stress-
ing the Saudi importance.
It is against these potential figures that one should consider the
actual OPEC production for 1973, 1976, 1979, and 1982, and the March 1982





Saudi Arabia 22.4 540 9.0
Kuwait 9.2 140 1.0
Iran 7.6 150 33.0
Iraq 5.6 75 11.0
United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi 4.2 .
Dubai 2.0 . 125 0.5
Sherjah 0.06
Venezuela 3.0 120 12.0
Libya 3.0 100 2.5
Nigeria 2.3 120 61.5
Indonesia 1.3 80 129.0
Algeria 1.3 50 16.5
Qatar 0.5 30 0.2
Ecuador 0.2 10 7.0
Gabon 0.06 10 0.8
TOTAL 62.72 1250 284.0
Sources: Proved reserves -- Oil and Gas Journal, 27 December 1982
(7.3 US barrels 1 t);
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How the aspirations of OPEC members have been unsettled by the
fall in world demand, since 1979 in particular, for their oil;
The obvious problems faced in setting the March 1982 quotas; and
The contributions that the members could make if demand was
there.
Table 3. OPEC crude at! Production (Mt), 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982
Sources: 1973-1979 -- BP Statistical Review, 1981; 1982 -- Oil and Gas
Journal, 27 December 1982 (7.3 US barrels 1 t);
March 1982 Quotas -- Petroleum Economist, London, U.K., April,
p. 118.
Includes half the production of the Partitioned Neutral Zone.
Production tables, like Table 3, imply that all tonnes of oil are of
equal value, but they are not. Crude oils vary greatly in characteristics
that are not only reflected in different prices but also affect availabili-
ty. Where countries have more than one type, they attempt to ensure that
the heavier crudes, which are less easily refined into the higher, more
valuable product fractions, are not left unsold, but are sold in the ratio
with lighter crudes proportional to their reserves.
There are currently some 13 oil-exporting non-OPEC developing coun-
tries but, except for Mexico, their reserves and production are globally
insignificant but domestically very important.
Mexico has had a long and chequered petroleum history that provides
excellent examples of the physical, social/political, and economic factors
that affect crude-oil availability and must be con8idered in any research
into such matters. Mexico's first peak production in 1921 at 26.5 Mt/year
was second only to USA in the world, but then fell to only about 4.4
1973 1976 1979 1982 March 1982
quotas
Saudi Arhia 1 382 434 485 331 250
Kuwait l 154 110 128 40 52.5
Iran 293 295 158 95 120
Iraq 99 119 171 46 60
United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi 63 77 70 44 '
Dubsi 11 16 18 18 . 55
Sharjah 0 2 0.7 O.35
Venezuela 179 123 125 91 83
Libya 105 93 101 56 55
Nigeria 100 103 114 66 65
Indonesia 66 75 79 67 65
Algeria 51 50 57 37.5 36.5
Qatar 27 24 25 17 15
Ecuador 10 9 10.5 11 10
Gabon 7.5 11 10 6.5 7.5
TOTAL 1547.5 1541 1552.2 926.35 874.5
Mt/year in 1932 as the prolific fields of the Golden Lane were depleted.
The industry was nationalized in 1938 and then began a long, slow, hard
climb back, until in the early 1960s, the rich new southern provinces and
then the rich offshore fields in the Gulf of Campeche were discovered and
exploited. The 1921 peak was equaled in 1973 and production increased
fivefold to 137 Mt/year in 1982. Mexico, like Norway, usually publishes
its petroleum reserves as an aggregate of oil and gas in terms of oil equi-
valent. This can be misleading. However, its Proved Reserves of crude oil
increased from 1.24 Ct at the end of 1977 to 6.6 Ct at the end of 1982.
The increase was due not only to the southern additions but also to 1.5 Ct
attributed to the Chicontepec area of the central region. The reservoirs
here are very different from those in the south. Individual well producti-
vity will be low, thousands of wells will be required, and so the drilling
effort will be long and costly -- another example that all reserves are not
equal. Nonetheless, with exploration in all areas far from complete,
Mexico is already in the Iran/Iraq category of Proved Reserves, and could
be capable of a production of 150 Mt/year for 40 years, or a very much
higher production for a shorter period. The long, hard, and virtually
unaided struggle has made the Mexicans determined to produce only as much
oil as they consider necessary for Mexico's needs as they judge them. They
will not repeat the overproduction of the 1910s. They will not become
overdependent on one outlet, even to their big neighbour, the USA. Their
recent financial problems are due to overborrowing in the expectations,
shared by the bank lenders, of increasing production and higher prices.
Nonetheless, they have collaborated with Venezuela in a scheme to offer
favourable crude sales terms to their Latin American neighbours who would
invest in exploration for their own indigenous petroleum resources. They
therefore both diversify their outlets and held the economic stability of
the area.
No other non-OPEC developing country is self-sufficient in petroleum
and, until they become so, each will be dependent on imports varying accor-
ding to the size of that element in the energy mix that they develop as
best suited to their own needs. Are there other sources for those imports
than OPEC or, to a more limited extent, Mexico?
The industrialized nations of OECD had only 9% of the world's Proved
Reserves of oil at end 1982, but 59% of the 1981 consumption (Table 1).
OECD in total will be a net importer for very many years. Individual
exceptions will be the UK, for several years, and Norway for longer, but
the natural markets for any surplu8 are Europe and the USA. The US domes-
tic production of conventional crude oil peaked at 482 Mt/year in 1970 but
has been held around the 433 Mt/year mark since then, mainly because of the
Alaskan discoveries. Whether this level of production can be maintained
will depend on the development of potentially prolific "plays" such as off-
shore California and in the Overthrust Belt of the Rockies. New geological
concepts and improved drilling and production techniques can lead to new
discoveries even in a country as well explored as the USA. However, des-
pite new discoveries ii-, the USA and other OECD countries, it is very diffi-
cult to see how the OECD area will have surplus oil for export to the rest
of the world from conventional sources.
The Centrally Planned Economies (CPE) do not publish reserves data.
The estimates of Table 1 show the CPE to have 13% of world Proved Reserves,
27.5% of production, and 22% of consumption. The bulk of these is in the
USSR. Estimates of the Proved and Unproved Reserves of the USSR range from
5 Ct to 50 Ct; nevertheless the 8.6 Ct in Table 1 is probably a low esti-
mate. The USSR, however, may be expected to tailor its consumption of
crude oil in the energy mix to allow some export to Comecon, for political
reasons, and to the West, for economic reasons, to earn hard currency.
Despite an American report of 1977, it would seem probable that Soviet oil
production may plateau in the 1980s but rise again in the 1990s as the
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necessary infrastructure is built to allow the exploration and expoitation of
the sedimentary basins 0f Siberia. Certainly there is little likelihood of
the USSR being able to export large amounts of oil, nor need to import large
amounts, in the short and mediin term.
The People's Republic of China also does not publish reserves data.
Estimates of Proved and Unproved Reserves have ranged from 3 Ct to 30 Ct. The
Figure used for Proved Reserves in Table 1 is 2.7 Ct. China is in a very
early stage of exploration. There are good prospects offshore, but the speed
of their exploitation after discoveries will be subject to political direc-
tion. Hence, with the very large potential ckmestic market, it is again
unlikely that much oil will be available for export.
In brief, oil supplies for the non-OPEC developing countries are most
likely to be available from new indigenous discoveries or from OPEC, particu-.
larly from the Middle East, and, perhaps to a limited extent, from Mexico.
Natural g
The Proved Reserves of natural gas are more widely distributed than
those of crude oil, but supplies are less flexible. Table 4 shows the 10-fold
growth in published Proved Reserves from 1950 to 1982, particularly in the
USSR who8e Proved Reserves at end 1982 were estimated at 32 Ct oil equivalent
(GT-oe) and so 41% of the world's 77 Gt-oe. The Middle East is second with
almost 20 Gt-oe, or 25% of world Proved Reserves in contrast to having 55% of
world Proved Reserves of crude oil.
Sources: 195ff-8ff -- Valais (19821;
1982 -- °t' and Gas Journal, 27 December 1982 (1 Mt oil 39.2
billion ft').
Table 4. World natural g Proved Reservee,
end 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 end 1982
1950 1960 1970 1980 1982
Actual amount (Gt-oe)
North America 4.77 7.30 8.47 7.21 7.7
Latin America 0.63 1.26 1.71 3.87 4.8
Western Europe 0.09 0.27 3.15 3.51 4.0
Eastern Europe and USSR 0.09 1.62 8.83 23.69 32.0
Africa - 0.54 3.42 5.50 4.5
Middle East 1.62 3.96 6.13 16.85 19.6
Asia and Oceania 0.45 0.55 1.44 4.41 4.5
WORLD 7.65 15.40 33.15 65.05 77.1
Distribution (%)
OECD 65 50 36 18 16
CPE 1 11 27 38 42
OPEC 25 35 32 35 33
LDCs outside OPEC 9 5 5 9 9
100 100 100 100 100
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The gas data of Table 4 must be viewed with caution, because all gas is
not equally available -- the gas associated with oil is dependent on the rate
of oil production. All gases do not have the same calorific value -- most
gases contain some inert, nonflammable gases that may be a significant part of
the total volume. In the USA, where the percentage of nonhydrocarbon gases
is usually low, this is ignored because it is accounted for by the price being
related to calorific value. In other areas, the percentage may be less than
the possible estimation error. Nonetheless, the reserves figures must be
treated as being indicators rather than absolute values. Furthermore, a.l-
though there has been a marked reduction in the amount of associated gas being
flared, there is much more wastage of gas than of oil.
A more important feature of natural gas is that its exploitation re-
quires high investment in pipelines, both at the gathering and distribution
ends, with either major trunk lines or, where ocean transport is entailed,
special tankers for LNG plying between high cost liqueficat ion and gasifica-
tion terminals. Commercial investment in these fixed facilites means that
specific long-term contracts are required to ensure continuous throughput:
"spot cargoes" are uncommon. The size and location of the market is therefore
vital in determining whether investment is warranted and therefore whether gas
supplie8 are available.
The size of both the Soviet reserves and the West European market war-
ranted the major pipeline systems installed and under construction. The gas
market in south-west Russia, which grew as local oilfield production declined,
warranted the major pipelines from Iran and Afghanistan. Similarly justifi-
able were the pipelines from southern Mexico to the USA, Algeria to Italy, and
the LNG ocean trade from the Middle East to Japan. However, the LNG trade
between Algeria and the USA foundered on price, which has been a hurdle on
other deals as the gas producers seek parity with oil prices. Major LNG
export schemes for Nigeria have only been talked about for many years, while
Iran's schemes have been halted by revolution and war. World trade in natural
gas has not grown as many expected in 1974-75, but major projects are still
being considered. Two examples are the Spanish proposal to the International
Energy Agency (lEA) in May 1983 for a $10 billion pipeline from Nigeria
through Morocco and the Straits of Gibraltar to Western Europe, and the LNG
schemes agreed in February 1983 for the development of the offshore North
Field of Qatar, which has some 90 Mt-oe Proved and 200 Mt-oe Probable Re-
serves.
In general, therefore, the availability of natural gas supplies is re-
stricted by logistics. An indigenous supply for local use is valuable, but
imports into small markets may not be possible, economically or physically.
Availthility Of Petroiei Sources
As Alternatives To Conventional Petrole
It is in this area that fact and fiction become most mixed in popular
talk and writing. The alternative sources are those hydrocarbons that cannot
be exploited by currently conventional means -- the very heavy oils, oil
sands, oil shales, gas in tight formations, gas under high pressure, or gas
occurring as gas hydrates.
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Very heavy oils
There are many occurrences of very heavy oils in many countries, which
may have a considerable total tonnage. The accumulations that are most dis-
cussed are those in the USA, Canada, and Venezuela, but other deposits include
those in the USSR, Iraq, Madagascar, Sicily, and China. Techniques for their
exploitation exist, but only very favourable local economics would make most
deposits commercially viable on these techniques.
Oil sands
An indication of the oil reported to be recoverable from the better
known of these deposits is given in Table 5. These are not Proved Reserves
comparable with those of crude oil because only in Canada are oil sands com-
mercially exploited or have been systematically assessed. The Tar Belt of
the Qrjnoca Basin in Venezuela is an cummulation of oils that vary from
heavy through very heavy to Natural Tars. The lighter types have been exploi-
ted for many years and schemes for increased explotation into the heavier
types have been studied. However, as with the additional schemes for the
Alberta Oil Sands of Canada, the schemes that were well advanced when oil
prices were rising have recently been postponed; initial capital investment is
high and costly when interest rate8 are high; lead times from start to produc-
tion are long.
Tthle 5. Oil NReearves from some oil sand deposits,







Source: World Energy Conference Survey, 1980.
Oil shales
The oil shale exploitation is similar to that of oil sands. The figures
reported to the World Energy Conference (Table 6) indicated considerable re-
sources, but again, although they purport to indicate oil recoverable under




Source: World Energy Conference Survey, 1980.
The "oil" in oil shale8 is in the form of solid kerogen that must be
distilled to yield a liquid oil. The yield varies considerably from 12 to 400
Lit, which immediately indicates the enarmou tonnages involved in any but
very small operations. Some deposits vary greatly in richness and few have
warranted the investigation needed to give good data.
Since the exploitation of oil shales in Scotland and Sweden was killed
by cheaper imported oil, commercial use has only been in the USSR, particular-
ly as raw fuel for power stations in the Baltic States, and in the People's
Republic of China (PR China), where in the open-cast coal mine at Fushun,
Liaoning Province, shale is excavated with the coal and is retorted.
In Brazil, a pilot plant has been running for many years. There is
exploration work planned in Morocco but some of the reports confuse reserves
of oil shale and 9hale oil. Jordan has had feasibility studies made of its
largest deposit but exploitation is probably many years ahead. Thailand's
shales have not yet attracted foreign capital and the government only plans
for a small power plant using raw shale as fuel and a feasibility study for a
small extraction plant. Australia is listed in the 1980 World Energy Confer-
ence Survey as having only 460 Mt as an additional resource, whereas it
appeared that the first large commercial plant might be on the richest depos-
its in Queensland, which was said to have 2 Ct of shale oil resources and a
production of 1 Mt/year was planned for the early 1990s. The project was
postponed in 1981 as uneconomic. In the USA, with government help promised by
the Carter Administration, it again seemed that commercial exploitation was
close, but the Reagan Administration withdrew that promise of direct help and
there is still no production.
Undoubtely there are many oil shale deposits that might be exploited by
known techniques of mining, particularly open-cast mining, or even in situ
methods that are still all in the experimental stage. Some deposits have been
Table 6. 9iale oil reserves in some countries

















looked at with help from the United Nations. However, the problems of exploi-
tation must temper dreams to reality. For 50 years at least, it has been said
that the potential oil from oil sands and oil shales would be a ceiling to the
price of crude oil. This is a myth. There is still no commercial exploita-
tion of even the richest of the deposits in the USA, despite the 15-fold
increase in crude oil prices in the past decade.
Unconventional natural gas
The exploration for and exploitation of these sources are even more
dependent than unconventional oil deposits on both funds and expertise that
non-OPEC developing countries cannot be expected to possess. The deep geo-
pressured zones of Texas and Louisiana are not yet commercial. Similar geolo-
gical conditions may occur elsewhere but it would seem sensible to wait until
methods of exploitation have been proved before spending much effort on defin-
ing such places. Gas hydrates are found in the permafrost areas of Siberia,
and so need not concern countries in the tropics, and in ocean floor sediments
of the deep oceans, where again high cost and expertise will be required for
exploitation and only theoretical ideas as to methods have materialized. Nuc-
lear explosions have been tried to extract gas from some very tight rocks but
without commercial success. In the past few years, arguments have been put
forward for the presence deep in the earth's crust of primordial methane that
could supply enormous amounts of energy. These ideas are interesting specula-
tions, but there are equally strong arguments against such gas being ubiqui-
tous and the practcalities of specific accumulations adequate for exploita-.
tion have not been demonstrated.
In brief, therefore, there seems little likelihood for supplies of
unconventional natural gas being available to petroleum-deficient developing
countries for a very long time, if ever.
Deiuvend And Need For Oil end Gas
As oil and gas are but two of the elements in the energy mix, the size
of demand for them will depend on the total energy demand and on the need for
them, both in areas where they are in competition with the other elements
because of the possibility of substitution and in the end-use areas where they
are essential and have little or no competition.
Total energy deisend
Ever since the publication of "The Limits to Growth" (Meadows et al.
1972), macroeconomic models to forecast demand, both global and national, have
proliferated. Few have done more than emphasize the importance of some fac-
tors: none have given a credible long-term forecast for which events in the
short term have not altered the basic premises to such an extent that, despite
the scenario technique, only generalities have emerged.
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Wynne Godley (1983) wrote:
Macroeconomics is in a state of deep confusion. The profession is deep-
ly divided. So far from there being any body of knowledge which is
generally accepted, almost every proposition is extremely contentious.
Public discussion of economic policy has no coherent rationale and
governments, notwithstanding their emphatic rhetoric, cannot give a
credible explanation of how their policies will not achieve the results
they seek, nor have they any basis for negotiation with one another.
Certainly, for the energy aspect, the main reason is ignorance of hard
facts about the availability of supplies, the criteria on which demand may be
assessed and the reactions that the market will have to new situations. The
ignorance results in surprise at what happens, this causes uncertainty, which
in turn results in aberrant actions, reactions, and consequences.
The developing countries number about 100; as a group, they represent
nearly half the world's population, account for 25% of world economic output,
and 15% of world commercial energy consumption (lEA 1982). Oil provides al-
most 65% of the commercial energy supplies. Breaking down these totals into
significant groups for discussion on demand is difficult because of the
variations in the characteristics of all countries, as instanced earlier and
shown by every study choosing different groupings, which makes collation of
facts extremely difficult. Here, however, discussion will be confined to OPEC
and non-OPEC groups.
Orgiization of PetroleM Exporting Coi,.triee (OPEC)
By definition, oil is their main source of both energy and revenue and
is traded as a commodity. Their domestic demand for petroleum depends not
only on their population and stage of industrial development, but also, main-
ly, on government policy, which is itself dynamic.
Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria, Algeria, and Venezuela have relatively large
populations (Table 1) and need high oil revenues to support economic develop-
ment programs, but their ratios of oil reserves to production capacity are
comparatively low. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates
(UAE), and Kuwait, with relatively small populations, have been producing oil
at more than domestic revenue needs and have accumulated surplus funds that
they wish to safeguard from loss of value. Taher (1982) argued that, by co-
operation between the oil-producing and -consuming countries, the time re-
quired for the producers to effect structural changes to raise their standards
of living and attain economic and social stability could be matched to the
rate of transition in consuming countries to a balanced energy mix, without
over-dependence on oil. He chose three scenarios to illustrate the consequen-
ces of the three option8 that he saw as possible -- cooperation, neutrality,
and confrontation. The figures used by Taher are given in Table 7, together
with the ranges given for the Developing Countries by the International Energy
Agency in their 1982 Outlook for Energy (lEA 1982).
In all three scenarios, Taher envisage8 OPEC consumption rising, being
27% of the world total in the cooperation scenario but only 18% in the con-
frontation scenario.
Libya illustrates the dramatic effect of recent loss of revenue and
resulting actions that have affected OPEC and will continue to affect the
oil-producing developing countries. Libya, with a population of around 3
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Table Actual and oil and N (NT) in7. proepective crude consu.ption
ource8: (1) -- Taher (1982); (2) -- lEA (1982: 168-169).
CP = Cooperation scenario, N Neutral scenario, CF = Confrontation scenario.
million, saw its 1980 income of US $22.6 billion fall to $10 billion in 1982,
even though, despite the agreed quota in March 1982 of' 55 Mt/year, Libya was
producing at the rate of about 90 Mt/year by the end of 1982. The action
taken was to reduce development projects originally scheduled at $62.5 billion
over 5 years, delay payment to contractors, and cut consumer-goods imports in
the 1983 budget to 60% of the capital-goods imports for light and heavy indus-
try. Similarly, Indonesia announced delays in four major oil projects in May
1983.
In contrast, Kuwait has become the first Arab producer to sell direct in
the European market by buying assets of the Gulf Oil Company in Europe: assets
that included 1600 retail outlets and two refineries. This restructuring
started in 1980 and is just one indication of the sort of changes that must be
anticipated when considering tho8e and similar projections of consumption.
Non-OPEC developing coimtries
A middle-income subset of this group, that is those countries taken by
the World Bank as having a GNP per person of at least US$360 in 1978, particu-
larly the semi-industrialized countries, share many of the problems of the
industrialized countries, with major dependence on oil and a need to increase
efficiency in energy use. The low-income subset with a GNP below US$360 per
person derive half their total energy from noncommercial sources but rely on
oil for the bulk of their commercial energy. A major problem is that many of
the non-OPEC developing countries do not have the "autonomous strength," as
Taher puts it, to adjust easily to the new energy situation. The new situ-
tation is illustrated by the rise in the cost of oil imports to the oil-impor-
ting developing countries from US$8.3 billion in 1973 to US$91.1 billion in
1980, with an outstanding debt increasing from tJS$ 97.4 billion to $370.1 bil-
lion according to the International Monetary Fund (lEA 1982). Relief can only




1987 1979 CP1 N CF CP N CF CP N CF
OPEC
(1) 75 110 210 185 170 345 270 220 830 505 305
(2) 195-180 275-250 435-375
Other LDCs
(1) 355 420 575 520 460 655 570 485 505 400 290
(2) 465-445 610-535 1050-825
WORLD
(1) 2850 3250 3620 3310 2954 3510 3055 2565 3075 2385 1695
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Taher's scenarios are essentially based on pre-1979 thinking, whereas
the lEA figures are post-1979. This explains the lower growth ascribed to
1985 and 1990 by lEA (Table 7) although their figures for 2000 are more opti-
mistic. However, Table 7 has been included here to emphasize the following
points:
Demand and supply are inseparable;
Demand and need are separable -- the price increases of 1973-74 and
1979 had a marked effect on demand and, by increased efficiency and
substitution, reduced the need for oil, and some of these effects
will be permanent; and
The former close parity between economic growth and oil consumption
has been broken.
Further, the post-1979 fall in demand has significantly affected supply:
There is surplus production capacity in OPEC;
Complacency as to future supplies has returned in some minds;
Investment interest in alternatives to crude oil has dropped;
The structure of oil refining has changed in that, although refining
capacity is surplus -- because plants were constructed to a higher
future demand level and refineries are being closed -- more upgrad-
ing capacity is being installed to provide more light fractions,
because of the reduced demand, through substitution particularly by
coal for heavy fuel oil for steam raising in power stations and
industry; and
A surplus of tankers has dropped freight rates and reduced the gap
between short- and long-haul crude sources.
All these factors bear on the relative values of dit'ferent crudes and
natural gas, as well as on the total tonnages marketed. In the past, these
factors have often been underestimated, but the arguments about relative crude
oil prices in the first quarter of 1983 have brought home to many people, cer-
tainly in Britain, that different crudes have different values. It is impor-
tant to remember this when considering any crude oil data and when considering
oil prices, using a marker of Saudi ArabianLight Crude, as indicative of
future oil supply/demand trends.
Oil Resources Arid Oil Prices
Even in 1980, many thought that oil prices must inevitably continue to
rise, but by late 1982 some were predicting the possible collapse of OPEC-
controlled prices. By mid-May 1983, the danger seemed to have lessened as
producers saw the dangers of a price war. The optimists were seeing signs of
world economic recovery, but few saw any but slow growth ahead for many years.
A slow economic recovery will mean a more gradual increase in oil rmand
because of the changes resulting from the oil shocks of the 197Dm. If one
assumes that a 4% per year recovery will mean a 2% per year growth in oil con-
sumption in the world outside of the communist areas (WOCA), it would be 1990
before oil consumption equaled that of 1979 (Netschert 1983). Therefore,
OPEC's peak production of 1565 Mt/year in 1977 may not be required until, at
the earliest, the early 1990s because of the growth meanwhile of non-OPEC
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production, from 765 Mt/year in 1977 to 1010 Mt/year in 1982 and increasing.
Therefore, it could be the mid- or even late-1990s before there could be a
"normal" supply shortage to pu8h crude oil prices in real terms over the 1982
price of US$34 pb in 1982 dollars or $16 pb in 1972 dollars.
Demand could grow faster than 2% per year through more rapid economic
recovery and complacency slowing down substitution and conservation. Saudi
Arabia may show restraint in recovering its production rate from as low as 175
Mt/year estimated for May 1983, to its 1979 level of 470 Mt/year to accommo-
date the undoubted wish of the other members of OPEC, particularly han and
Iraq, to recover their lost production. If these increases in production are
made without a fall in prices, then there could be a semblance of stability.
Oil prices would then rise only with inflation, if that continues to be a
characteristic of world economics. This 8cenario would give the currently
debt-ridden developing countries time to recover by selling into the expanding
market.
If, on the other hand, the precarious balance achieved in March 1983
with effectively all producers avoiding a price war does not hold, then prices
could plummet at least, perhaps, to a floor of the costs of say North Sea
oil. It is difficult to see how world-wide financial and economic chaos could
be avoided. This danger is appreciated and therefore, hopefully, is unlike-
ly. At the other extreme, it also seems unlikely before 1990, that a sudden
boom could materialize that would mop up the current surplus capacity and
force up oil prices above inflation.
Resuming, therefore, the middle course, care must be taken that the
capacities of Table 2 are not assumed to be automatically attainable. Produc-
tion facilities deteriorate when not used and rehabiliation can be slow.
Furthermore, lead times between discoveries and production in established
areas are several years and in new areas in hostile environments may be 10
years. However, one must expect that the national security aspect of indigen-
ous petroleum will maintain a reasonable level of exploration both in the
industrialized countries and in the non-OPEC developing countries, despite the
suggested slow recovery in oil prices and, possibly therefore, slow investment
in alternative sources.
In the longer term, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, some of the pre-
sent OPEC members may be nearing the end of their petroleum resources at the
production levels implied in this middle scenario, but not Iran, Iraq, or
Kuwait, and certainly not Saudi Arabia. In the late 1990s, if not sooner, the
weight of Saudi reserves could be expected to become the dominant force in
pricing and production levels. The Saudis have demonstrated their apprecia-
tion of their strength and the need to use their strength wisely. Therefore,
as long as the stability of the Kingdom remains, oil price stability can be
maintained within the circumstances of the scenario suggested. Obviously the
chances of stability would be enhanced if there was the international cooper-
ation, which the Saudis and others would like.
Research Priorities For Developing Countries
The order of research priorities must be different in detail for every
developing country because of the great variety in their resources and needs.
However, I have attempted to indicate some of the uncertainties of our current
knowledge and also one possible world petroleum environment in which all may
have to operate. Study of individual countries will be required to determine
how best each amy operate successfully, but there seem to four general areas
within which study would be of major benefit.
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Increase in basic knowledge of indigenous energy resources
Geological survey techniques have developed greatly in the past 50
years, but they still cannot give answers sufficiently fast for the politi-
cians. Nonetheless, hard and relatively slow research work is vital. A quick
report by a consultant may be helpful but is no substitute for permanent local
competence, which 8hould be initiated or expanded, with outside help if need-
ed. Vladimir Baun (UN 1982) noted that:
Most developing countries recognize the need for solid institutional
structures to deal with the complexities of energy policies.... In more
than 80 countries national oil enterprises have been established.... A
petroleum exploration policy can be devised only in the light of the
specific circumstances in each individual country and its own per-
ception of its development priorities.
Therefore, although it is essential to detail the logical steps in
exploration, and to study case histories, as were excellently handled in Part
II of the 1981 UN meeting in the Hague on "Petroleum Exploration Strategies in
Developing Countries," yet the individual circumstances of each country are
paramount.
Identification of the optimua energy mix
All are agreed that petroleum must be linked with the overall energy
needs and the national objectives. In most developing countries, however,
there is little information and few trained personnel to gather data on the
true needs of the country. Furthermore, there may be great, perhaps insuper-
able, political difficulties in identifying and presenting the true needs.
For example, when Reza Shah Pahlevi tried to break the power of tnomadic
tribes by settling them, he created a "modern" demand for farm tractors and
diesel fuel, but the main effect was to reduce the agricultural resources and
the flexibility of Iran, for only nomadic grazing could optimize the benefits
of the semi-arid environment. In other words, the total environment must be
considered in the identification of the optimum energy mix -- the human,
natural, capital, and technological resources in the particular social, ecolo-
gical, and political circumstances.
Identification of the opti meens to attain the opti energy mix
There are dangers of fashionable trends that must be avoided. In the
late 1950s, many developing countries considered a domestic oil refinery as an
essential symbol of nationhood. In the 1980s, there is a danger that a petro-
chemical plant may have a similar appeal. An OPEC Secretariat paper to a
seminar in Vienna in 1983 cautioned that production expansion of ethylene,
despite an estimated doubling of demand in the Third World, should not be
attempted except in those countries with "ample material endowment or poten-
tial power to penetrate world markets..'.. For the majority of developing
nations, imports of basic or intermediate feedstocks will prove more economic-
al." Although, perhaps, there is greater need in the petrochemical industry
for vigorous and rigorous research before investment, yet the general point
holds for all new projects. Unfortunately, the misplaced euphoria created by
expectation of a limitless flow of petrodollars led to some status symbol
projects in the later 1970s, which are "white elephants" in the early 1980s.
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Eoonomice of the total thei.n fro. supply to end use
Realistic praisal of the economics of the total chain from supply
through transportation and conversion to end use is not an easy task. Full
allowance must be made for all costs when alternatives are being compared
(Sierila 1983).
Conclusion
Finally and in sympathy with a major theme of this paper of viewing the
total environment, there is need for determining how best to foster self-reli-
ance. Fortunately, there seem to be signs of growing preciation that blam-
ing "the others," moaning against the present economic and financial struc-
ture, and begging for "cash," does not bring prosperity. The änly answer is
hard work.
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The still near-concensus view of the future outlook for oil remains one of
continuing real increases in prices (except for the very short term) and of an
inevitable near-future peak in global oil production (again ignoring the tempo-
rary turn-down of the past 3 years as a result of cyclical influences on the
market). The bases for this pessimistic view on the future of the world's major
source of energy emerge, however, from the extrapolation of two sets of condi-
tions that determined the history of the international oil industry before 1973:
A high exponential growth in the use of oil as a sine qua non of the
process of economic development; and
The necessary geographical concentration of oil production in a limit-
ed number of countries and a growing dependence of the rest of the
world on exports from these countries.
Global energy/oil models explicitly define, or implicitly assume, that
these are, indeed, necessary conditions for the future of oil with a resultant
near-future constraint on the ability of oil to meet the world's energy needs.
In this paper, however, I argue that the two sets of conditions were
unique to the historic period 1948-73 so that their use in forecasting the
future of oil is quite inappropriate. Post-1973 evidence, together with recog-
nition of the reality of the 1948-73 conditions, indicate clearly the need for a
reevaluation of medium- and longer-term oil supply/demand relationships. Work
that we have done on these relationships suggest that the short-term weakness in
the international market is likely to per8ist -- or to become even weaker --
over the next 30 years, as the general condition. Althoui this secular trend
will, of course, be interrupted from time to time by abnormal and unpredictable
political events and, in addition, there will be short-term variations in the
price of oil for cyclical economic reasons.
Conditions that Deterained the Pre-1973 Oil Market
Generally high economic growth rates in the pre-1973 period were accompan-
ied by an even higher exponential growth rate in oil use. The apparent correla-
tion between the two became, indeed, an article of faith. So much so that impor-
tant elements that indicate that the relationship was little more than coinci-
dental have been ignored or discounted.
First, the low and sharply falling real price of oil throughout the period
incorporated careless and wasteful use components in the high increases in
demand. These are being eliminated by high prices and are unlikely to return
given a fundamentally changed perception of oil (energy) situation.
1 This is a preliminary working paper and should not be quoted without express
permission of the author.
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Second, all types of economies in the world were then going through in-
creasingly oil-intensive periods of development, e.g., the mass consumption of
durable household goods, the mass-motorization phenomenon, and the accelerated
suburbanization process in the industrialized countries, the use of rapidly
increasing amounts of oil in the centrally planned economies, as a consequence
of their industrialization in regions where the use of coal was not practicable;
and the Third World's near exclusive use of oil in the energy-intensive, initial
industrialization period.
Third, in the industrialized world, accounting for most of the world's
total use of energy, oil was being substituted for coal in every country as the
result of contrasting labour cost conditions in both production and use, and of
contrasting environmental considerations.
This extraordinary temporal coincidence of factors that pushed up the use
of oil so rapidly over the 25 years for 1948-73 can never occur again.
On the supply side, the intense geographical concentration of production
emerged from several factors.
British/U.S. political control over the Gulf region and over a number
of other countries created conditions in Which there could be an unre-
stricted exploitation of the oil resources discovered in these
regions.
The highly prolific and low-cost nature of the resources discovered
enabled production in these countries, the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), to grow rapidly enough to more than satis-
fy even the 7.5% per year growth in demand so that the search for
resources elsewhere was largely abandoned, while the exploitation of
other, already known resources was undermined.
Production from the OPEC countries was, moreover, increased rapidly in
spite of the declining real price of oil in the market place -- large-
ly as a result of the incidence of intense competition in the interna-
tional oil industry from 1958 to 1970. In these circumtances, the
companies could only remain profitable by concentrating their upstream
activities in the proven low-cost oil countries and they were thus
obliged to ignore alternative options for producing oil.
Overall, it was these specific politico-economic conditions, rather than
inherent resource-base considerations, that produced the highly skewed global
geographical distribution of oil reserves and production capacity over the
more-than 20 years leading up to the early 1970s.
This powerful melange of both oil-demand and oil-supply factors was the
prime cause of the revolution in the world oil system in the early 1970s:
although its timing was determined by the almost equally extraordinary set of
political events that affected the main actors in the world oil industry after
1968. These consisted of the reestablishment of cooperation between most of the
western world's oil companies to achieve orderly markets; the belated recogni-
tion by the companies that OPEC could be used as the reason why the price of oil
had to increase; the subsequent joint interests of the companies and OPEC in
moving oil prices up after 1970, and the even more powerful impact of the Arab-
Israeli war in 1973 in this respect; the upstaging of the companies by OPEC's
members in 1973-75 when the latter decided the companies were irrelevant to
supply and pricing questions; and, finally, an event that not only saved the
exporting countries from the miscalculation they had made of their strength, but
also enabled them to double prices yet again -- that is, the revolution in Iran.
As a result of all these politico-economic changes, the hitherto plentiful
supply of oil, albeit from a geographically limited part of the world's ultimate
oil base, was converted over the short term to one of scarcity -- arising from
restraints on production and development by small numbers of suppliers. Oil
production elsewhere could not be expanded quickly. Even in the USA, the indus-
try had been too weakened by international competition, and elsewhere there were
no short-term supply prospects of any significance. This short-term absence of
alternative supplies was critical for prices given the high exponential growth
in oil use, the expectation that this necessarily had to continue, and the
unwillingness of the industrialized countries to curb demand by direct controls.
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The "scarcity" that emerged in the 1970s was, thus a political-cum-insti-
tutional problem. It has, however, ever since then generally been interpreted,
or rather misinterpreted, as an unchangeable, or even an uncontrollable, devel-
opment in the evolution of the global oil industry. Th18, in turn, has generat-
ed a near-unbelievable decline in confidence among oil companies that, iritil
1973, were absolutely certain of their abilities to provide the world with
whatever volumes of' oil (and gas) it proved to need for the forseeable future.
Consequences for Oil (and Energy) Forecasting
As a result of the powerful impact of the pre-1973 demand/supply condi-
tions and relationships, and given the misinterpretation of the real nature of
the post-1973 oil situation, oil and energy forecasting has since developed
under the influence of basically false premises -- in respect of demand, supply,
and price.
Expectations on the demand side have been too high. This is partly
because of an underestimate of the oil shock (and other factors) or, the pros-
pects for economic growth, but the failure to recognize the very special demand
conditions of the 1958-73 period for energy use in general, and far oil use in
particular, has been of more importance. With conditions of radical, even revo-
lutionary, change, there was an inexplicable unwillingness to consider both the
price and income elasticities of' demand and the significance of the 8ubstitution
of the use of oil by the use of other sorts of energy. Markedly lower use
rates, compared with the pre-1973 period were, and indeed to some extent still
are, seen as the aberration, rather than as the return to the normality of
long-term energy growth rates from which the experience of 1948-73 was the
essential divergence. In the long term, a 5% per year energy growth rate was a
very high, rather a normal rate that, hitherto, had averaged 2.2% per year
(Marchetti and Nikicenovic 1979).
Moreover, in the context of expanding availabilities of energy sources
that can substitute the hitherto dominant oil component in the global energy
picture, the use of oil must now grow at a rate lower than that for energy over-
all for at least the rest of the century.
Expectations for the medium to longer term (politically nonconstrained)
development of the oil-supply potential have, by contrast, become too low. When
the companies still had confidence in their own abilities to control the devel-
opment of the world's oil resources, they did not he8itate to prognosticate a
long-term future for tIe industry which, by definition, required a resource base
of at least 5000 X 10 barrels -- as shown in Fig. 1. Their withdrawal from
this view coincided with their declining power in the system. This produced a
change of mind on their part on the global availability of oil reflecting their
idea that if they were riot encouraged, or at least allowed, to find and prove
the world's oil then there were no alternative organizational or institutional
arrangements that were capable of taking over the upstream activities. Thus,
they argued, much of' the world's oil must remain unexploited. Hence, instead of
the minimum 5000 x 1O9 barrels of expected ultimately useable oil, the under-
standable, but nevertheless the nonsubstantiated,, views of the oil companies now
wrote down the total oil potential to 2000 x l0' barrels, which in the context
of a demand growth rate of 7.5% per year until 1985 and at 5% per year as long
as possible thereafter produced the view of the future of oil illustrated in
Fig. 2.
The increased prices for oil since 1973 have been thought to give the
classical market signal of' resource scarcity, with repeated references to the
"market price" for oil carrying the inference of competitive market clearing
prices to which all other energy prices must "wisely" be adjusted. But post-
1973 oil prices have been no such thing: they have represented a virulent new
strain of oligopolistic pricing -- in the context of short-term supply con-
straints by producers exercising a temporary control over global output levels,
and with the effects exacerbated by inappropriate user responses motivated by
the industrialized countries' interpretations that oil demand was inherently
price-inelastic. The levels to which oil prices rose by 1980 under these cir-
cumstances thus provide a singularly inappropriate base from which to speculate
on future price developments -- arid on potential supply and demand develop-
ments. A reevaluation in respect of all three components is clearly necessary.
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Fig. 2. Cimiulative discoveries aid production of oil over tise (1940-1980)
d aiial production (1940-2050).
Medi-teru outlook for price behaviour
The long-run supply price (LRSP) of oil in 1970 -- and the shape of the
curve over the previous 20 years was derived by Adelman (1972) before the oil-
price shock and has recently been confirmed at a level of US $2 per barrel (in
1973 dollars) in work by Fayat (1983). This curve is shown in Fig. 3 but with
prices converted to 1980 dollars.
The evolution of the LRSP is a function of the future rate at which the
use of oil cumulates, as it is this which determines the timing of the need to
move to the production of successively higher coat oil resources. An indication
of the changing shape of the future LRSP curve is also given in Fig. 3 with the
rate of growth in oil use ranging from a high of 7.5% per year from 1970 (the
expectation at the tine of Adelman's analysis) down to 0% beginning in 1983 (a
rate which should be compared with the -0.59% per year average decline in oil
use over the last 10 years).
From the base-year of 1980, a curve has been drawn to represent the evolu-
tion of the LRSP in a situation of oil use increasing exponentially at 2.5% per
year. We have argued (Odell and Rosing 1983: 172-182) that the annual average
rate of increase in oil use will not exceed this level. Our views in this
respect are basically a function of the arguments set out in the first two sec-
tions of this paper. It is a rate of increase that is much higher than the
average for the last 10 years (-0.59% per year), and higher than the oil indus-
try's next 10-year view of the market potential. We do not think, therefore,
that there will now be much dispute over our choice of a 2.5% per year growth
rate as one that is very unlikely to be exceeded.
The rise in the LRSP curve from 1983 shown for this rate of growth in use
under the impact of oil use before 1983 is relatively gentle until well into the
21st century. The justification for this emerges from a continued availability
of large volumes (over 600 x 1O barrels) of oil that is profitable to produce
at $4 per barrel or less (in 1980 dollars). The derivation of this is shpwn in
Table 1 and relates essentially to the known proven reserves of 635 x 10 bar-
rels in 1973 and which reserves were, by definition, economically recoverable at




















































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. Deriving the availability of low-coat oil j 1983a
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Oil that is economic to produce with a price of $4 per barrel or less in
1980 dollars.
Table 2. Future use proapecta for currently available low-coat reserves8
1 World oil use, 1982
2 Low-cost oil reserves to production (RIP) ratio
3 Effective R/P ratio with a -0.59% per year
continued decline in oil use
4 R/P ratio assuming an average 2.5% per year
growth in oil use
5 Assume:
a 2.5% per year oil use growth
that 75% of world oil demand will be
supplied by low-cost known reserves
a depletion curve restraint (viz., a
minimum R/P ratio of 11 years) on the
use of low-coat oil
Then:
Production of low-cost oil will peak in 2001
610 x i09 barrels, am derived in Table 1.




Oil amounts (x i09 barrels)
Total Low-cost Higher-cost
Remaining Proven Reserves, 1973 635
Oil use, 1974-82 190
Higher-cost oil 40
Net use of low-cost oil 150
Remaining low-cost 1973 Proven
Reserves, 1983 485






reserves at beginning of 1983 610
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Table 2 shows how, irder various specified conditions, the low-cost oil
could keep global oil production moving ahead. The "simple" and the "effective"
ratios of reserves to production are indicative of time spans to exhaustion, and
are thus purely conceptual. Of more importance is the indication of the period
-- that is to after the year 2000 -- during which this low-cost oil could sus-
tain a growth rate of 2.5% per year, with but a modest amount of help from the
use of some higher-cost oil in conditions or countries, or both, in which such
theoretically uneconomic oil can be marketed. This would be in conditions in
which (as currently) the price of oil in the market is above the LRSP, and in
countries where protection is given to higher cost indigenous production -- for
strategic or economic policy rea8ons (as, for example, in the USA and the USSR
and, say, India or Brazil in the Third World).
The LRSP curve that relates to the 2.5% per year average rate of growth in
oil use is shown as moving slowly up from its present (1983) level of $5 per
barrel for the rest of the century -- as such an upward trend is required so
that the propensity to invest in increasing cost oil can be maintained. Thus,
after the year 2001, when the decline curve for the output of currently known
low-cost oil sets in, the price at $10 per barrel (in 1980 dollars) is high
enough to ensure a smooth uptake of higher cost oil -- as and when required.
If we take 2010 as the end of the medium-term future, then, the volume of
higher-cat oil that would have had to be used by then remains modest -- about
200 x 10 barrels. There is a near zero likelihood that this will not be dis-.
cohered by 2010 given, first, the volume that was discovered in 1974-82 (120 x
10 barrels) some of which will not be used in the interim period as it will not
be competitive with low-cost oil; and, second, the potential availability of
large additional volumes of oil from environments with which the industry is
already familiar (e.g., the continental shelves in tropical and temperate lati-
tudes), and through technologies with which it is used to working (e.g., en-
hanced oil recovery from known fields).
In other words, for the medium term, supply/demand relationships indicate
an LRSP for oil that always remains much lower than the price of $28.50 in the
reference year of 1980 and well below the level to which the price has now fal-
len -- about $24.50 in 1980 dollars. There are a range of possibilities open on
the levels of price in the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. For 1990, we put the
range at 67-94% of the 1980 level ($19.10-26.80 per barrel); for 2000, from 56-
81% of the 1980 price ($16.00-23.00); and for 2010, from 45-75% of the 1980
level ($12.80-21.40). This steadily falling price over the 1980-2010 period
reflects our view that a price collapse to the LRSP will be averted by means of
convergent OPEC and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
oil supply and pricing policies. The range of price levels by 1990 and in suc-
ceeding years will thus be a function of the timing and the intensity of the
negotiations out of which the convergent policies will emerge. This is demon-
strated graphically in Fig. 4.
On the Langer-ter. Proepecta in Theory
There is some danger that there will be no real longer-term pro8pects for
oil because of a perception of the medium-term outlook that is very different
from the one described above, and the consequential possibilities of policies
that, as a result, will serve to kill the industry. Continued too-high prices
for oil, and further loss of confidence by the oil industry in its ability to
cope with a changing global political environment, coupled with a failure to
secure the establishment of' institutions that are capable of keeping the oil
industry expanding (a highly relevant issue after 3 consecutive years of de-
cline) could well lead to too little use of oil in the future.
In this respect, it is worth noting that five recent comparable models of
world oil (forecasting up to 2020) all show the industry peaking at or before
the year 2000, at levels of output little higher than that of the historic 1979
peak. Furthermore, tey all imply a total cumulative world oil use by 2020 of
about 1450-1550 x 10 barrels -- as demonstrated in Table 3. The world oil
industry would, moreover, by then according to the five models, be so long past
its peak that even the lowest estimate of the world's conventional oil resources
would still mean an availability of enough oil for a decline period extending




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Toble 3. Five sdels of' global oil ime, 1980-2020
i -- Calc4ation of' arithmetic mewi of non-Coixiist world oil production
Cx 10' barrels/day)
ii -- Adjuat.ent of the medals to a total world basis (x ig barrels/day)




iii -- Implied ciusulative global oil irne to 2020 in world oil medels (x it)9
barrels)
A 796.5 357.7 427.8 1582.0
B 764.1 357.7 427.8 1549.6
C 643.1 357.7 427.8 1428.6
0 698.2 357.7 427.8 1483.7
E 767.9 357.7 427.8 1553.4
AverageC 765.4 357.7 427.8 1550.9
Source: World oil: Summary report. Stanford University, EMF Report 6, tables
A5-A9, 1982.
Notes: Model A is Salant/ICF of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Model S is
WOIL of the U.S. Department of Energy; Model C is Kennedy/Nehring of
the University of Texas/Rand Corporation; Model 0 is OILTANK of the
Chr. Michelsen Institute (Norway); and Model E is OILMAR of the Energy
and Power Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives.
From Table 3(i).
b Author's estimate.
C Arithmetic mean of the five models as calculated in Table 3(i).
1980 40.6 51.4 47.7 51.8 48.5 48.0 0.084
1990 52.1 53.5 46.8 49.8 55.7 51.6 0.027
2000 64.9 53.2 47.7 48.6 52.0 53.3 0.052
2010 53.3 50.0 38.3 44.1 49.5 47.0 0.050
2020 47.8 44.4 31.7 37.1 48.4 41.9 0.089
Year Production (%) Production (%) Production (%)
1980 48.0 14.9 62.9
1990 51.6 +0.73 20.9 +3.44 72.5 +1.43
2000 53.3 +0.32 25.2 +1.89 78.5 +0.80
2010 47.0 -1.25 27.2 +0.77 74.2 -0.56
2020 41.9 -1.14 30.5 +1.15 72.4 -.0.02
Model Coefficient
Arithmetic of
Year A B C 0 E mean variation
Model oil use Communist Total
1980-2020 oil use World world
Model (non-Communist) 1980-2020 pre-1980 to 2020
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unconventional oil and oil from coal), even though the prices they predicate are
far above the level at which the backstop oil would become economically attrac-
tive to produce. The industry, they seem to suggest, will, in other words, have
been so weakened by contemporary difficulties as to render it incapable of ever
utilizing the world's oil resources.
The key issue for ensuring the survival of the oil industry is downward
movement in prices whereby oil is made sufficiently attractive to use, compared
with inherently higher cost, but much lower-priced, alternatives (such as coal,
nuclear power, and most renewable energy sources). In this respect, long-term
oil models that, as a result of illogical constrained supply and unjustified
hi exponential growth in oil-use assumptions, show real oil prices rising to
153.5% of their 1980 level (Beltramo and Manne 1983), or about. 175-180% of pre-
sent prices, are counter-productive in their effects -- not only for the future
of the world oil industry as such, but also for the western world's economic
growth prospects overall. Such prospects are worsened as a result of the infla-
tionary consequences of continued oil-price increases, and the inevitable deci-
sions by governments to devote too many scarce resources of capital, management,
and other expertise to investment in higher-cost alternative-energy develop-
ments.
Given the, by now, quite strongly institutionalized barrier to a realistic
attitude to the future of oil2, it is highly unlikely that the probabilities of
future growth rates for oil will be any greater than those shown in Fig. 5. For
example, there is only a + 10% probability that the growth rate will be 2.62%
per annum or higher; only a 50% probability that it will reach 1.5% per annum
and a 10% probability that it will be only 0.5% or less. Nevertheless, for pur-
poses of setting out future oil-use/resource-availability relationships let us
assume that the growth rate in use can be pushed back up to an average from 1980
of 2.62% per year. In the context of this level of future use of oil, there is
really little need to get heavily involved in the contentious debate over the
prospective volumes of ultimately recoverable conventional oil (see for example,
Dunnington 1982; Odell and Rosing 1982).
We may thus ignore, on the one hand, the high estimate of 11 000 x iü bar-
rels of such oil made by Soviet Academician Styrikovich (1977) and described by
him at the time as a "cautious estimate"; and similarly, on the other hand, the
few ultrapessimists in the oil industry with theAr estimates of ultimate conven-
tional oil reserves of no more than 2000 x 10' barrels. Not, incidentally,
that such estimates imply that there are only another 400 x 10 barrels of oil
to be found in the world -- after allowing for use, plus currently Proven Re-
serves, and the appreciation of those Proven Reserves. This is an impossibly
low figure, given the large areas of the world that remain to be explored for
oil. A widely accepted minimum figure for ultimately recoverable conventional
oil, with some degree of enhanced recovery is (including oil used to date) 3000
x barrels. Against a growth rate of 2.6% per year, and an upper limit of 50
x barrels on the annual rate of additions to reserves (emerging from both
new discoveries and the appreciation of previously discovered oil reserves),
this produces the depletion curve shown in Fig. 6 with the prospects for growth
in conventional oil production through until 2017.
But this, of course, covers only part of the world's potential ultimate
oil reserves, as there is still also oil from unconventional habitats, as well
as heavy conventional oil (but still excluding the potential for making oil from
coal) to be taken into account. These resources (the development of some of
which is already under way -- albeit prematurely, given the higher costs in-
volved) are usually disparagingly referred to as "backstop" or "reserve" oil,
and so inappropriately categorized when judged from an economic standpoint.
Instead, one needs to approach their utility simply as an additional set of oil
reserves that are quite capable of being converted into the oil products that
are demanded by consumers. Oil users are, indeed, quite indifferent to the
origin of the standardized oil product8 they need in terms of the oil's original
habitat, or its pattern of physical occurence -- in the same way that coal users
are indifferent to the deep-mined or open-cast origin of a supply of coal with
specific quality characteristics.
2 By no means the least of the causes of this development was, unhappily,
the report of the Energy Systems Program Group of IIASA (1981) in which the






















Fig. 5. Ct.ulative probabilities of real future growth rates greater or
less than/equal to y specific growth rate eati.ate.
Thus, in economic terms, we can assume that the resources of conventional
and unconventional oil provide a continuum of oil products' supply to be market-
ed in the context of a rising LRSP (see Fig. 4). There is no doubt that the
ulimately recoverable resources of unconventional oil total a minimum of 2000 x
10 -- given present technology and the present state of knowledge of the
world's relevant geology (Meyer and Fulton 1982). With more geological explora-
tion and evaluation, and with developing production and treatment technology,
the world's resources of unconventional oil would become a multiple of this
minimum figure.
Let us, however, assume an ultimate availability of 2000 x io barrels,
and then further assume that all unconventional oil is higher cost than the most
expensive recoverable conventional oil so that the former only enters the market
as the latter becomes unable to sustain a specific growth rate in oil use. If
we again take the 2.62% per year growth rate and plot tis mgainst a total oil-
resource availability of 5000 x 10' barrels (: 3000 x 10 barrels of convention-
al oil plus 2000 X i09 barrels of unconventional), then the curve of depletion
is as shown in Fig. 7. The industry now reaches its peak production in the mId-
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Fig. 6. Cumulative discoveries sod production over ties, sod ainual pro-
duction, 1940-2080, based on a total resource availability of 3000 x i09
barrels, sod a rate of increase in urns of 2.6% per year.
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Fig. 7. Cumulative discoveries (A, left cia) and production (B, left
axis) over ties, sod sonual prq1uction, 1940-2080, based an a total re-




















The output relationship between conventional and unconventional oil (on
the assumptions as specified) within the total is shown in Fig. 8; and Fig. 9
shows separately the required contribution of unconventional oil to the develop-
ing supply curve -- its contribution starts in 2012 and the production of uncon-
ventional oil peaks in about 2060. In other words, the use of unconventional
oil is essentially a 21st century industry, so that recently announced delays in
the exploitation of, for example, Orinoco basin heavy oil, oil from the Athabas-
ca tar-sands, and oil from shales in the USA recognize in essence the premature
moves that were made toward the production of these higher-cost oil resources
under conditions of the false -- or mistakenly interpreted -- oil-price signals
of the 1970s.
FIg.7
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Fig. 8. Annual production 1940-2080 based on total resource availabili-
ties of 3000 x ig barrels (Fig. 6) and 5000 x 10' (Fig. 7) and a rate of




Fig. 9. Required contribution of amconventional oil tq. fLit the qsp










mechanistic approach as described in the previous section. The interests of so
many powerful nations and other groups are now so tied up with present oil
prices that prices seem almost certain to be higher in the short to medium term
than they need be, given the resources/use relationships that have been estab-
lished as theoretically possible in the preceding section. Morover, in the
more-difficult-than-necessary economic world that will emerge from the misinter-
pretation of the oil prospects, financial and other resources will unwisely be
devoted to the production and protection of some high-cost alternative energies
-- and also high-cost conventional oil, unconventional oil, or oil from coal --
according to the local or national circumstances. More generally, rates of
economic growth will be kept down in an atmosphere of protectionism and beggar-
thy-neighbour attitudes.
The overall result will, on the one hand, be an enhancement of the supply!
potential supply of energy in general, and of oil in particular and, on the
other hand, a limitation on the rate of use of oil (in the context of a reduced
energy-use rate): the inevitable disequilibrium between supply and demand will
be controlled by interventionism in the market for as long as the costs are not
perceived as being too excessive, and this will be justified politically, as
now, on the grounds of oil being an inherently scarce commodity. The outcome
will not be comfortable, but it will probably be workable, providing Third World
debt can be kept under control and providing the development needs of the Third
World can continue to be ignored.
In this context, more rather than less oil resources will be sought and
found (as a result of high prices and of nationalistic attitudes toward invest-
ment in the industry over the long term) and less rather than more oil will be
used (also as a result of high prices, of government policies that deliberately
seek to minimize oil use, and of consumers' perception of oil as the energy of
last resort). Thus a long-term global oil resources/use relationship that would
appear more realistic than the combination of 5000 x barrels with 2.6% per
year examined in the previous sectAon is one in which the resource base side is
mQderately increased (to 5800 x lO barrels) and the rate of use element reduced
to just under 1.9% per year -- the input values in a simulation that we have
described elsewhere as the joint 50% probability value of parameter values




































Fig. 10. Cijiulative discoveries (A, left axis) and production (8, left axis)
over time, aid annual production, 1940-2080, based on a total resource avail-
ability of 5800 x iø barrels mci a rate of increase in use of 1.9% per year.
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the simulation also in,çludes a maximum annual addition to reserves constraint
(of just under 75 x lIP barrels). The world oil industry now take longer to
grow to roughly the same size as with the combination of 5000 x l0' with 2.6%
per year values. The peak of oil production is reached in 2046-47 at about 3.5
times its 1980 size: and in 2080, even after over 30 years of postpeak decline,
the industry is still 1.5 times its 1980 size and at that date about 20% of the
world's ultimate resources of' oil will remain to be used. In essence, the
potential growth phase of the global oil industry is still a near three-genera-
tion phenomenon. Even after peak production has been achieved, moreover, there
are unlikely to be constraints on the availability of oil for present nonsubsti-
tutable uses for at least another generation (on the assumption that such uses
rise to between 45 and 50% of total oil use).
Reduced Price Oil d the Global Energy Economy
With relatively modest views on world oil resources -- conventional and
nonconventional (so modest, indeed, that they are little higher than the minicnum
near-certain ultimate availaility of oil) -- and a rate of increase in use that
now needs to average over 2.0% per year (to make up for the decline in use since
1979), the global oil industry still has at least a 60-year growth potential.
In the meantime, as shown earlier in this paper, there are only political or
institutional factors or both, that need put the market price of oil (in real
terms) above the 1980 average level of about $28.50 (for Saudi Arabian marker
crude) in the medium-term future (until 2010). Thereafter, as shown in Fig. 4,
the LRSP curve will start to move up more sharply (to enable higher-cost conven-
tional oil to be recovered and to generate interest in the recovery of unconven-
tional oil, which we have hypothesized will need to enter the supply pattern in
the second decade of the 21st century). By the time the oil industry is approa-
ching its peak in the late 2040s, the competitive price of oil may well be
reapproaching its historic peak level -- after almost 70 years of oil at a lower
real price than in 1980.
With a growth rate in oil use, which now has to average just over 2% per
year to achieve the average annual increase in use from 1980 as presented in
Fig. 10, the contribution of oil to total world energy supply will fall -- but
only very slowly in the context of an overall energy-use growth rate of 2.2% per
year up to 1990, 2.4% in the 1990s, and 2.5% after the year 2000. The relation-
ship of oil to other sorts of energy supply over this 30-year period is shown in
rigs. ii and 12. Oil's contribution falls from 46% in 1980 to about 38% by
2010. Incidentally, the increasing share of natural gas in the total supply of
energy over this period, as a result of plentiful resources and its availability
in the main energy-consuming areas at below oil-equivalent prices, will multiply
the volume of gas used by 2010 to three times its 1980 level. Thus the share of
oil and gas, which together may reasonably be said to constitute the "petroleum
industry," will remain more or less constant, at just under two-thirds of the
world's total energy supply.
This availability of low-cost, lower-priced gas will, of' course, exercise
a powerful downward pressure on the oil price, and this effect on oil will be
enhanced by the similar impact of competitive coal in the energy marketplace.
Coal supply and use will double over the 30-year period and coal's share of the
total energy market will increase slightly. On the other hand, primary electri-
city and heat from nondepletable resources seem unlikely even to maintain their
share of total energy supply under the set of values described in this paper.
Their too-high capital and other costs, plus the question of the public accept-
ability of some alternative sources of energy -- notably, of course, nuclear
power -- relative to the lower costs of developing adequate oil, gas, and coal
supplies, and to the falling real price of oil (and other competing energies) in
the 1980s, will undermine the viability of investment in primary electricity
production and other alternative sources.
In essence, the world's energy system in 2010 will still be very much a
hydrocarbon-dominated one -- with, at that time, almost 35 years of growth for
oil and even longer for gas still to come; and with oil and gas available at
prices ranging from less than half to no more than three-quarters of their pric-
es in 1980. Even then there will be plenty of time for alternative energies to
1980
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be researched, commercialized, and slowly incorporated into the modestly expand-
ing global energy economy. For the rest of this century at least, it would be
preferable to concentrate investment of scarce capital and managerial and scien-
tific resources in the oil and gas sector of the global energy economy: the
rates of return to such investment will be much greater than its investment in
nonoil and nongas developments. Thereafter, the balance of allocation will
slowly change and eventually create the possibility of alternative sources of
energy being available in sufficient volumes and at low enough prices to curb
the need for, or the desirability of, producing and using the world's least
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Fig. 12. Distribution (%) of energy supply frau various sources, 1980-2020.
Implications for Developing Countries
Several important implications that emerge from this analysis of the
nature of the oil crisis are specific to the interests and the policy options of
the world's developing countries. These are set out below in a highly tentative
way.
If, as we concluded, the price of internationally traded oil continues to
decline from the peak prices of late 1981-early 1982, then the foreign exchange
and associated debt problems of the poor, oil-importing countries will be miti-
gated. Moreover, with a continuing fall in real oil prices, the prospects for
the western world's economy will be improved with a resultant improvement in
the level of demand from abroad for other goods and services supplied by the
developing countries. Finally, moderation on the upward pressures and pressures
generated by the falling price of oil (and energy) will add yet a further stimu-
lus to the developmental prospects Of many Third World countries. Thus, any
feeling of solidarity in developing countries for OPEC's attempts to maintain
today's high oil prices must be tested in the context of the economically
favourable effects of lower oil prices for the nonoil-exporting Third World
nat ions.
The moderation of the level of oil prices depends, as we have shown, on a
radical reevaluation of the prospects for oil supply/demand relationships and a
better understanding of the real nature of the oil crisis. As so much opinion
in the industrialized world is so firm in its acceptance of the conventional
view of the future of oil -- partly as a result of the influence of the anti-
developmental views of many environmentalists and followers of the "limits-to-












protestations of indigenous high-cost energy industry and strategic considera-
tions via a via Soviet influence in the Middle East) -- the developing coun-
tries' policymakers have an important role to play in changing the climate of
opinion and in securing the acceptance of policies that open up a higher prob-
ability for energy at lower prices for the medium- to longer-term future.
It is necessary for developing countries to determine whether their inter-
ests would best be served by an oil-price collapse to the LRSP (taking into
account the likely effects of this on the stability of the world economy, on the
motivation for energy efficiency, and on the competitiveness of indigenous ener-
gy production) or by a slow, continuing decline in oil prices as predicated in
the context of an OECD-OPEC convergent policy (see Fig. 4). If the latter i8
considered to be a preferable option, then intervention in the OECD-OPEC negoti-
ations would be appropriate to secure a rate of decrease in prices that is cal-
culated to be in the best interests of developing countries, and to ensure that
the negotiations are not concluded solely in the interest8 of the two richer
groups of nations, nor without reference to the energy-supply development poten-
tial of other parts of the world.
The projections made in this paper on the future of oil depend on demand
remaining constrained and on supply potential being enhanced. In the short
term, neither development depends very much on policies and action by developing
countries.
On the demand side, the rate of growth in developing countries' use of
oil has a minor effect only on the evolution of the overall global
situation, given their less-than-20% share of the total world market.
For example, a 1% fall in use in the industrial countries more than
offsets a 4% average increase in use throughout the developing world
where even a 10% per year increase translates into a less than 0.5%
per year global increase in oil use -- if demand elsewhere is stag-
nant. This is advantageous for developing countries' policies towards
oil, given the relatively higher contribution of oil to their total
energy needs and their lesser immediate ability to change their econo-
mie8 and societies to the use of alternative energies.
On the supply side, there has been a continuing general weakness of
the Third World to expand its upstream oil industry activities. Its
share of total world exploration activities has fallen since 1973 and,
with a few notable exceptions, development work has continued to be
relatively slow and uncertain. This means that additional oil-produc-
ing capacity in the 1980s will be located mainly in North America,
Western Europe, and Australia. The "notable exceptions" in the Third
World will, of course, enjoy increasing benefits from their successful
oil development efforts but, overall, this will be of small signifi-
cance in the global context for the rest of the decade.
In the medium -- and even more so -- in the longer term, the contribution
of the developing countries to the future for oil hypothesized in this paper
will become relatively more important -- and eventually critical.
Oil uae
Given the contrasts between the structures of the energy economies of
developing countries and those of countries elsewhere in the world, the propor-
tion of total global use of oil in the former must grow, though how quickly
depends mainly on the future shape of the oil-use curve in the industrial coun-
tries. Thus, by the mid-1990s at the earlie8t and soon after 2010 at the lat-
est, the question of the efficiency with which oil is used in the developing
countries and the degree to which they are successful in reducing the contribu-
tion of oil to their total energy needs will become critical in ensuring the
maintenance of a modest global rate of growth in oil use. Success in these
respects for the medium to longer term depends, however, on the immediate evolu-
tion and the near-future implementation of policies that seek to achieve these
objectives. This is necessary to ensure that the emerging patterns of societies
and economies do not perpetuate the energy-wasteful and careless settlement,






















































































































































which patterns of development in the industrialized world have been based and
which have often, unfortunately, been taken over "lock, stock, and barrel" by
developing countries in the initial phases of modernization and change.
The development of efficient and effective energy-using systems is often
more capital-intensive and usually less acceptable politically than energy-care-
less and wasteful systems. It is thus a difficult problem -- with a degree of
urgency attached to finding a solution to it, if the world is going to enjoy
relatively lower-cost oil over the extended period shown to be possible in this
paper.
Oil supply
Figures 13 and 14 put the medium- to longer-term perspectives for future
oil-production potential from the Third World into context (see Odell 1981 for a
fuller analysis of these issues). In essence, the truth of the present situa-
tion is that the oil industry has not yet progressed much beyond its infancy in
terms of effective search for the potential for oil production in most parts of
the Third World. With about 50% of the global potentially petroliferous areas,
the Third World has secured -- and, indeed continues to secure -- no more than
5% of the total worldwide petroleum exploration and development effort. This
not only constitutes the most important failure of the world oil industry to
date, but it is also the most important challenge facing the industry -- in
respect of it8 upstream activities -- for the future. The background to the
intense geographical mismatch between the industry's effort and the opportuni-
ties is, moreover, essentially political-economic and geo-political rather than
inherently geological. The geological prospects for oil resources in the Third
World could be worse to much worse on average than in regions such as North
America and other areas that have already been intensively explored without
undermining the chances of the developing countries finding more than enough oil
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On the one hand, the companies of the world oil industry became largely
unacceptable over the years in many countries of the Third World because of
fear8 of economic imperialism. And, on the other hand, the companies themselves
have largely written off these potentially petroliferous parts of the world for
their investments -- they are simply too risky. Thus, as shown in Table 4, the
developing countries' ultimate oil potential is severely understated by the
world oil industry -- compared with others with continuing interests in the
areas concerned. The companies' disinterest in the opportunities in the Third
World is, however, no reason for the potential resources to be declared nonexis-
tent. Revised or entirely new institutional arrangements are required to enable
the challenges of the oil opportunities offered by the developing countries to
be taken up. The search for acceptable new/revised arrangements must be a high
research priority, given the difference that the exploitation of indigenous oil
(and gas) resources can make to the longer-term pro8pects for individual coun-
tries' economic development prospects -- and to the future of the global oil
industry.
Table 4. Eati.atee of the ultimate ot resources of the Third
World (barrels x 10 )
Oil industry Grossling Visitaky
views (USA) (USSR)
(a) (b) (c)
Source: (a) Based on figures in Nehring (1978: 88) adjusted to give com-
parable geographical coverage with (b) and (c) above. Nebring also states
(p. 88) that his figures for these regions are "roughly similar" to those
published elsewhere by oil industry observers. (b) Grossling (1979).
(c) Visitaky et al. (1977).
Elsewhere (Odell and Vallenilla 1978; Odell 1981), I have set out possible
approaches to, and in8titutional arrangements for, ensuring the sufficient
availability of resources (financial, scientific and technical, and managerial)
to enable new oil reserves and production potential from the developing coun-
tries to complement those that already exist in the OPEC countries (as a result
of the activities of the international oil companies over the 30 years before
1913), and those that are now being found in the geographically limited parts of
the world where the existing international oil companies, which still control
90% of the appropriate expertise, are able to operate effectively.
What is at stake in responding to the challenge of a geographically more-
dispersed pattern of oil and gas exploitation on a large, and increasing, scale
is:
First, the means whereby a large number of developing countries can
rid themselves of the specific high-cost constraint of imported oil on
their own development prospects; and
Second, the establishment of conditions for sufficient economic pro-
gress and for enhanced and more widespread prosperity in the world
economic system generally: a prospect that is, in part, dependent on
Latin America 150-230 490-1225 686
Africa 120-170 470-1200 730
South and Southeast Asia 55- 80 130- 325 409
Total 325-480 1090-2750 1825
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the adequate availability of relatively low-cost oil (and gas) re8our-
ces to energize the expansion. The alternative is having to accept
the severe development constraints of either too little energy as in
parts of the Third World at the moment, or the too-high costs of chan-
ging too quickly to the use of inherently more expensive sources of
energy.
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The OPEC Multiplier: Rebound of World Oil Demwid
Throughout the 198Dm -- and probably much longer -- the world economy will
remain vitally dependent on oil, and most oil-importing countries will continue
to be largely dependent on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), especially on their Persian Gulf sources of supply.
Currently, OPEC is certainly in a crisis; its oil export availability
exceeds demand by a wide margin of well over 10 million barrels per day (Mbar-
rels/day). In some markets, the cost of imported oil has dropped substantially
over the past 2 years. However, it is premature to conclude from such develop-
ments, as many observers are now doing, that somehow current conditions will
become a permanent fixture of the world oil market. Some of these observers are
making serious errors of judgment and analysis. Others are seeking to validate
their own studies by generating results that fall within the ballpark of prevai-
ling opinion. Still others are drawing long-term conclusions from short-term
market conditions. All are allowing the wish to father the thought.
For the process that has sharply reduced OPEC production since 1970 can
also cause it to rise quickly -- leading to a tight world market in which oil
prices can once again jump substantially. The driving force behind this is a
process best described as the "OPEC multiplier." (For a full exposition of the
multiplier hypothesis, see Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani "The OPEC Multiplier," For-
eign Policy (Fall 1983) from which this 8ection is drawn.)
Betiind the drop in energy demand
The concept of the OPEC multiplier -- and its importance in determining
likely future trends -- becomes clear within the context of world energy-market
conditions. To begin, consider the following trends:
World primary-energy consumption dropped for the 3rd consecutive year
in 1982, reversing the pattern of steady growth that had prevailed
through the 197Os. World primary-energy con8urnption had risen at an
average annual rate of 3.9% between 1976 and 1979, but fell 0.7% from
the previous year's level in 1980, 0.6% in 1981, and an estimated 1%
in 1982.
The level of world oil production dropped even more rapidly. After
rising at an average annual rate of 4.2% in the period 1976-79, it
fell 4.9% from the previous year's level in 1980, another 6.9% in
1981, and yet another 5% in 1982.
The most dramatic reversal has occurred in OPEC oil production. OPEC
oil production rose at an average annual rate of 3.4% between 1976 and
1979, but fell 12.9% from the previous year's level in 1980, 16.4% in
1981, and 18.2% in 1982.
The OPEC multiplier explains this cascading pattern of reductions, and is
central to understanding the future evolution of the world oil market. The
overall decline in world primary energy consumption since 1979 has been attribu-
ted to three factors:
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First, irreversible conservation, or improved energy efficiency, which
has resulted from the turnover of capital stock. It is embodied in
more efficient cars, more efficient buildings, and new industrial pro-
cesses. Because such conservation occurs in response to higher pric-
es, it is called a price effect.
Second, reversible conservation, which has resulted from behavioural
changes such as turning down thermostats or using car pooia. This,
too, is a price effect.
Third, economic recession, which has led to a substantial slump in
industrial activity worldwide in the past 3 years. Reductions in
energy use in response to lowered national incomes are known as income
effects.
To sort out and quantify the contribution of each of these factors is not
easy, and their impacts differ from country to country. True, many energy anal-
ysts attribute about half the observed reduction in world primary-energy con-
surnption to price effects, primarily irreversible conservation. They credit the
other half to a mixture of other factors, such as income effects, climate, and
government policies. Some prominent analysts have gone even farther, attribut-
ing as much as three-quarters of the recent decline to conservation.
These analysts have probably overstated the post-1979 conservation
effects, however, and underestimated the effects of the recession on world
primary-energy consumption. If so, the implications are far-reaching for world
energy markets.
Indeed, the income effects much outweigh the price effects. Irreversible
conservation is a long-term matter. The demand for energy is relatively insen-
sitive to price changes in the short term. The full effects of higher energy
prices take place over a 10- to 15-year period (sometimes longer), as energy-
usinq equipment and buildings are gradually replaced in what is often referred
to as a process of structural adjustment. The effects of the 1973-74 oil-
triggered increases in world energy prices are now beginning to be felt, for
instance in the turnover of the American automobile fleet, although they have
had hardly any meaningful impact on the housing stock. The structural changes
resulting from the 1978-79 increases in energy prices will not be completed
until the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Moreover, high interest rates and recession over the last 3 years have
impeded some of the long-term investment in irreversible conservation that was
expected in 1979 and 1980. The changed expectation about oil prices is having a
further dampening effect.
Higher energy prices did, of course, prompt some immediate savings through
behavioural changes, such as reduced driving or thermostat lowering. However,
these gains are at least partly reversible in a period of declining real energy
prices.
In any event, the bulk of the short-term reductions in energy use -- weU
over half of the total -- should be attributed not to such long-term or short-
term price effects, but rather to the deep recession because energy consumption
is very responsive to the level and direction of economic activity. Indeed it
has been estimated that if everything else were held constant (prices, climate,
government policy, etc.), a 1% increase (decrease) in world economic output
would roughly translate into a 1% increase (decrease) in world primary-energy
consumption. The response of primary-energy consumption to changes in the level
and direction of prices is less pronounced; if everything were held constant, a
1% increase (decrease) in prices would roughly translate into a 0.1% decrease
(increase) in primary-energy consumption in the short run and a 0.3% decrease
(increase) in the long run.
Iw9act on OPEC
The recession does not, however, explain why world oil production has fal-
len more rapidly than overall world primary-energy consumption. The explanation
for this lies in what can be described as the residual fuel phenomenon -- a
driving force behind the OPEC multiplier.
- 49 -
In the 1960s, oil was generally regarded as the most favoured energy
source. It was cheap, plentiful, and convenient to transport and use. The
situation has of course changed since then, triggered in large part by the
1973-74 Arab oil embargo and subsequent oil-price hikes. In many of the largest
energy-consuming nations, from a public policy point of view especially, oil is
now generally viewed as the least desired of the primary energy-supply sources.
It is either more expensive than its alternatives or or is largely imported and
thus considered to be an insecure fuel, or both. Hence, when energy demand is
on the rise, indigenous energy supplies (e.g., hydroelectric power, coal, nuc-
lear power, or natural gas) are first tapped to meet that increase. Only then
do most consuming countries turn to oil. Similarly, when energy demand falls,
it is oil that is usually dropped first.
This description admittedly simplifies what is often a very complex set of
interfuel relationships, for example, oil cannot be readily replaced in some
uses, much as transportation. However, the description nonetheless underscores
the residual role played by oil in the world energy regime.
The extent of oil's residual role is brought home by a single fact: all
of the reductions in world primary-energy consumption during the past 3 years
have been borne by just that one fuel -- oil. In 1980, 1981, and 1982, world
production of hydroelectricity, coal, nuclear power, and natural gas continued
to grow, although at lower than historic rates. Because oil is only one compo-
nent of world primary-energy consumption, a small percentage decline in world
primary-energy consumption resulting from a slowdown in world economic activity
thus translated into a much larger percentage decline in world oil production.
What accounts for the even sharper decline in OPEC oil production since
1979? The answer lies in the multiplier effect. Much as oil is the residual
fuel in the world energy system, so too OPEC is the residual source of world oil
supply.
It is only after indigenous oil supplies -- where available -- are pro-
duced at capacity levels that countries turn to foreign sources of supply to
meet additional needs. Most countries -- and certainly the industrial countries
that account for the lion's share of world oil consumption -- first turn to such
non-OPEC suppliers as Mexico, Norway, and even the Soviet Union (currently among
the world' three largest oil exporter8), either because of considerations relat-
ing to price or security of supply. Only then do consumers finally turn to OPEC
as the supplier of last resort to meet residual needs. Conversely, as oil
demand begins to decline, whether as a result of falling economic activity or
rising prices, or both, OPEC oil is the first to be droped. In short, a small
increase, or decrease, in world oil demand results in a disproportionately large
percentage increase, or decrease, in demand for OPEC oil. This is the OPEC mul-
tiplier at work.
A few numbers illustrate this phenomenon. OPEC oil historically has
accounted for about 50% of world oil production. If, during a period of declin-
ing world oil demand, OPEC oil were treated like any other, then a 5% decline in
world oil production would result in a 5% reduction in OPEC production. If all
the decline is borne by OPEC as the residual supplier, however, then a 5%
decline in world oil production leads to a 10% decline in OPEC output.
Cycles repeated
The significance of this multiplier effect is that it not only works but
works in reverse as well. Thus, even a small percentage increase in world eco-
nomic activity and a concomitant increase in primary energy consumption in each
of the next several years could lead to a much larger percentage increase in




If so, the market would merely be repeating what was a pattern of the
1970s. Between 1971 and 1973 -- the last "normal" year before the first oil
price shock -- world gross dcmestic product (GOP) rose at annual rates of 4.3,
5.6, and 6.7%, respectively, while OPEC oil production climbed at rates of 8.2,
7.0, and 14.4% -- in multiplier fashion. With the onset of global recession in
1975 and an increase in production of nonoil energy supplies generally, and
non-OPEC oil supplies specifically, OPEC oil production plunged. Once economic
recovery got underway in 1976, a 5.4% rate of growth of world GOP translated
into a 12.9% increase in demand for OPEC oil. The reverse side of the OPEC
multiplier was clearly demonstrated.
These effects were less evident in 1977-78 because of increases in produc-
tion outside OPEC (most notably in Mexico, Alaska, the North Sea, and the Soviet
Union). Conversely, these effects have been sore pronounced since 1980 given
substantial net drawdown of oil stocks by the international oil companies. High
interest rates and changed expectations about price, demand, and supply have
created an imperative for the companies to unload large inventories, built up
during the Iranian revolution, which they have been doing at a rate that at
times has reached 3-4 Mbarrels/day (Fig.1).
['TI Primary Energy World Oil OPEC Oil
_I
1973 1974 197 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
YEAR
Fig. 1. OPEC .ultiplier effects, 1913-82.
OPEC is the residual supplier of energy to the rest of the world. As
such, it is the supply source most profoundly affected or multiplied by swings,
downward or upward, in world energy markets. Once global economic growth and
primary energy consumption pick up, say in 1983, the resulting recovery in OPEC
oil production could be disproportionately large. Indeed, falling oil prices
might even help trigger a more rapid rate of economic recovery than has been
thought possible. Falling real oil prices during a period of rising economic
growth will mean that the price and income effects will reinforce each other,
and together work to stimulate oil demand.
Two additional forces work to bolster future demand for OPEC oil. First,
falling real oil prices have already discouraged investments in a wide range of
energy sources, including natural gas, synthetic fuels, shale oil, nuclear
power, and even oil itself. Second, no major new sources of oil are in sight
for the rest of the l9BOs. Three new oil provinces -- Mexico, Alaska, and the
North Sea -- added 6 Mbarrels/day of supply to the world market between 1973 and
1981. Some increases in Mexican production notwithstanding, no further addi-
tions on this scale will come on stream in this decade.
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Shock zones
The sane forces that drove down demand for OPEC oil could drive it back up
again -- perhaps in as short a time. By the latter half of this decade, world
demand for OPEC oil could recover to its pre-1980 level of 30 Mbarrels/day --
well within the "shock zone" in which even a small short-lived disruption in
supplies could set off the third oil price spike in just over 12 years.
A first ingredient of a scenario for rapid recovery in demand for OPEC oil
would be a rate of world economic growth well within the range currently projec-
ted for the rest of the decade. At about 3% annual growth of GOP (slightly
lower for the industrial countries and somewhat higher for the developing ones),
world energy demand will also grow at about the same rate, especially during the
first years of recovery. Whatever savings occur during this period as more
energy-efficient plants and equipment come on stream will be offset -- probably
more that offset -- by the increased consumption that will result from rapidly
dropping real oil prices. This was the pattern after the 1973 oil shock.
Hence, the second ingredient is a weakness in oil prices (in real terms) over
the next several years.
OPEC oil prices -- adjusted for reductions in nominal prices as well as
for inflation -- have already dropped by 30-40% in the past 2 years, and at
least part of these savings have been passed on to final consumers. Real price
reductions have been the greatest in the United States, and the smallest in
those industrial countries whose currencies have depreciated with respect to the
U.S. dollar, the currency in which OPEC oil prices are quoted.
Consider what happens with an economic recovery that is accompanied by
only "modest" inflation -- 6-7% per year. This would mean that if oil prices
remained unchanged in nominal terms, a further decrease of 20-25% in the infla-
tion-adjusted price over the next 3 years would occur.
Clearly, the dramatic price reductions to date are already creating condi-
tions to stimulate renewed oil use. It is illogical to believe -- as some anal-
ysts insist -- that higher prices decrease demand permanently, but that lower
prices will not increase it. Although consumers will not jettison vehicles they
have already bought, will the U.S. automobile industry, for example, make the
planned large investments in future fuel efficiency under current market condi-
tions? Will motorists keep car pooling? Home-owners will not tear out their
insulation, but will they keep their thermostats as low in the winter and as
high in the summer? Businesses will not give up coal-fired plants if they have
already made the investment, but will they make new investments in such facili-
ties? Will industry substitute labour and capital for energy?
To believe the structural thesis, that energy demand is a one-way street,
one must also believe a great deal of uneconomic behaviour will occur. However,
the rapid recovery of world energy demand in the mid-1970s, resulting from
renewed economic growth and falling real oil prices, suggests otherwise.
To repeat, even with an assumption of modest economic growth, by the
latter part of the decade the world could face a tight balance between demand
for OPEC oil on the one side, and OPEC's physical ability to produce on the
other. The world oil market would then, once again, become vulnerable to that
volatile mixture of oil and politics that leads to a disruption of supplies and
to higher prices.
If past cyclical patterns are repeated, world demand for OPEC oil will
drop in the wake of another such price shock; but the market may nonetheless
remain tight in the latter half of the 1980s. For OPEC, oil-export availability
-- the true measure of OPEC's potential contribution to supplies -- will become
permanently constrained for reasons that are outlined below and that require
more careful consideration in any serious analysis of future world market
trends.
Measuring OPEC Oil-supply Availthility
In making estimates of availability of OPEC oil, three basic distinctions
predominate, although they appear under different labels. First, sustaznthle
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capacity represents an estimation of the maximum level of oil production from
each country's oilfields, as well as from the supporting infrastructure, that
can be sustained for at least several months. Sustainable capacity estimates do
not necessarily reflect how much oil is actually made available for production
in individual countries. For that purpose, a separate estimate of preferred
production, or allowables, is made, based on what is known or surmised about
policy ceilings on production below physically sustainable levels.
Estimates of production ceilings -- whether physically fixed or policy
constrained -- should not be confused with export availability, or that portion
of total production left over after domestic requirements for refined oil pro-
ducts are met in each country. Indeed, this last category is the key barometer
of OPEC oil availability.
Until recently, few countries either imposed or 8trictly adhered to policy
ceilings on production, and domestic requirements for oil products within OPEC
countries themselves accounted for only a tiny fraction of total output. The
situation has changed rapidly since the late 1970s, however, and these distinc-
tions need to be carefully made in any study of future OPEC oil-supply avail-
ability.
Of course, the amount of oil actually sold by the OPEC countries is a
function of world demand in any year within the bounds set by physical limits on
sustainable capacity, policy-restricted allowables, and domestic consumption.
However, a careful and systematic examination of the determinants of each of
these three constraints on OPEC availability will provide clues to the likely
future course of the world oil market.
Given information about the physical state of existing oilfields, the
political economy of oil production in each country, and the pattern of domestic
consumption of refined oil product8, it is possible to make reasonably informed
estimates of OPEC's sustainable capacity, allowables, domestic consumption, and
export availability in the latter part of the 1980s.
Sustainable capacity
Table 1 indicates a base-case estimate of OPEC's sustainable capacity
levels through the end of the decade. Despite uncertainties surrounding future
Table 1. Projected OPEC sustainable oil production capacity to 1990
(aillions barrels daily)
1982 1985 1990
Saudi Arabia 10.00 10.00 11.00
Iran 3.00 3.50 5.00
Iraq 2.00 2.50 3.50
Kuwait 2.50 2.50 2.50
United Arab Emirates 2.50 2.50 2.50
Qatar 0.60 0.55 0.50
Persian Gulf 20.60 21.55 25.00
Nigeria 2.20 2.10 2.00
Libya 2.00 2.00 2.00
Algeria 1.00 0.90 0.70
Gabon 0.20 0.20 0.20
Africa 5.40 5.20 4.90
Venezuela 2.30 2.20 2.00
Ecuador 0.25 0.25 0.20
Latin America 2.55 2.45 2.20
Indonesia 1.60 1.50 1.40
TOTAL OPEC 30.15 30.70 33.50
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sustainable capacity, all estimates in this table (and, in fact, estimates in
all ensuing tables) have been expressed as single figures rather than as rang-
es. Ranges, although admittedly more realistic in their caution (economic and
political vagaries in each country as well as other unpredictable events might
alter the individual projections for any given year), provide a less tangible
base for meaningful discussion.
Uncertainties over future sustainable capacity are greatest in the Persian
Gulf countries and least so in the rest of OPEC. It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that the estimates for Saudi Arabia and Iraq are somewhat lower, and those
for Iran somewhat higher, than estimates by other analysts.
OPEC's sustainable capacity will thus rise by 0.6 Mbarrels/day to 30.7
Mbarrels/day in 1985 and by another 2.8 Mbarrels/day to 33.5 Mbarrels/day in
1990. The only increases by 1985 will occur in Iran and Iraq whose production
levels today remain severely depressed because of war, and whose oil-sector
development programs have been deferred until cessation of hostilities. Sus-
tainable capacity in 1985 is all countries will not change significantly.
By 1990, sustainable capacity levels in Iran and Iraq will be further
enhanced by postwar reconstruction of oil infrastructure, and Saudi Arabia, too,
will have added about 1 Mbarrels/day to its sustainable capacity. With the
exception of Algeria and Venezuela, which are projected to suffer a small de-
cline (0.2 Mbarrels/day each), sustainable capacity levels in the remaining
countries will again remain basically unchanged.
Allowables
In the future, as in the past, several OPEC members are likely to retain
ceilings on how much oil will be availabe for production. Specifically, three
countries -- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates -- are expected
to maintain allowables, primarily in response to domestic conservationist senti-
ment, and also because, even at these levels, revenues from oil sales will
remain at comfortable levels.
Table 2 lists likely allowables for OPEC countries to 1990 under a "busi-
ness as usual" scenario. This qualification is important to make because such
Table 2. likely OPEC oil production allowthles to 1990
(aillion barrels daily)
1982 1985 1990
Saudi Arabia 8.80 8.50 8.50
Iran 3.00 3.50 5.00
Iraq 2.00 2.50 3.50
Kuwait 1.50 1.50 1.80
United Arab Emirates 1.50 1.50 2.00
qatar 0.60 0.55 0.50
Persian Gulf 17.1O 18.05 21.30
Nigeria 2.20 2.10 2.00
Libya 2.00 2.00 2.00
Algeria 1.00 0.90 0.70
Gabon 0.20 0.20 0.20
Africa 5.40 5.20 4.90
Venezuela 2.30 2.20 2.00
Ecuador 0.25 0.25 0.20
Latin America 2.55 2.45 2.20
Indonesia 1.60 1.50 1.40
TOTAL OPEC 26.95 27.20 29.80
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ceilings on production can be introduced or lifted quickly in response to a wide
range of political, economic, and diplomatic considerations and will remain the
most flexible of the constraints on OPEC oil availability.
Domestic consumption
Domestic oil consumption in the OPEC countries will continue to climb
steadily (Table 3) and, as a consequence, OPEC oil-export availability (see
Table 4) will begin to shrink by the end of the decade as these countries use up
an increasing share of their total output. The average annual rate of growth of
OPEC's oil consumption is thus estimated at about 5.5% between 1980 and 1990, a
rate higher than that projected for the rest of the world. This higher growth
rate in future oil consumption reflects expectations that the OPEC economies
will grow more rapidly, given these countries' access to secure and lower-cost
oil for use at home on the one hand, and the continued large flow of revenues
from the export of the balance of their production on the other.
However, even the OPEC countries are becoming increasingly aware of the
need for energy -- and particularly oil -- conservation. Until recently,
domestic fuel prices had remained largely unchanged in nominal terms in many
OPEC countries due to considerations of politics (considerable public opposition
to price hikes), economics (subsidies to export industries and the agricultural
sector), and equity (cheap fuel for the urban and rural poor). With rapid
growth in domestic oil consumption in the 1970s and prospects for ever-shrinking
export availability, however, many OPEC governments felt they had no choice but
to embark on price increases. Between 1979 and 1982, at least six OPEC members
substantially raised domestic prices for oil products, and some have vowed even-
tually to reach world price levels.
Table 3. Projected OPEC domestic oil conatption to 1990'
(million barrel8 daily)
* Includes refinery uses and losses and bunkers.
Niqeria 0.21 0.23 0.26
Libya 0.10 0.13 0.17
Algeria 0.13 0.13 0.17
Gabon 0.03 0.04 0.05
Africa O.5 0.65
Venezuela 0.42 0.43 0.46
Ecuador 0.09 0.10 0.15
Latin America 0'3T 0.55 1D.61
Indonesia 0.47 0.52 0.64
TOTAL OPEC 3.04 3.75 4.78
1982 1985 1990
Saudi Arabia 0.60 0.77 0.98
Iran 0.50 0.76 1.03
Iraq 0.23 0.38 0.49
Kuwait 0.13 0.14 0.16
United Arab Emirates 0.10 0.11 0.21
Qatar 0.10 0.01 0.01
Persian Gulf t57 7T7 7
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Higher prices will serve to uncouple, at least somewhat, the historic
relationship between economic growth and oil consumption in the OPEC countries,
as they have done elsewhere in the past 10 years. At the same time, although
some OPEC countries will continue to concentrate on building energy-intensive
industries at home, these industries will be based on newer, more energy-effi-
cient, imported technologies, and on nonoil sources altogether, such as natural
gas.
Few previous studies of OPEC domestic-oil consumption have considered the
effects of these developments on future demand in these countries, and thus they
generated projections that were unrealistically high. The first important
study, prepared in 1979 by analysts at the OPEC Secretariat itself, for example,
projected an almost eight-fold increase in OPEC domestic oil consumption to 16.6
Mbarrels/day by the year 2000. Although this figure was subsequently revised
downward, this, and in fact most studies of future OPEC domestic oil
consumption, have proved to be deficient in important respects. Several studies
simply projected total domestic-oil consumption under various economic growth
scenarios for the OPEC countries as a group, thereby neglecting important
differences in the growth prospects of individual countries and in those broader
government policies that affect energy use. Others did not break down demand by
type of refined product; the pattern of current and future product demand varies
considerably from country to country. Some studies included refinery fuels and
losses and bunkers, while others excluded this important component of' total oil
use. Most ignored the dampening effects of higher domestic oil prices on future
demand.
After attempting to correct these deficiencies, the projections of 1985
and 1990 domestic OPEC oil consumption presented here fell significantly below
most other published estimates. These projections of future OPEC domestic oil
consumption are, nonetheless, sufficiently high to influence the future course
of the world oil market as well as economic development prospects in individual
countries. As indicated in Table 3, OPEC domestic-oil consumption, including
refinery fuels and losses and bunkers, is projected to grow from about 3.0
Mbarrels/day in 1982 to 3.8 Mbarrels/dmy in 1985 to 4.8 Mbarrels/day in 1990.
Export availability
In 1982, total OPEC oil export availability stood at 23.9 Mbarrels/day out
of a sustainable capacity level of 30.2 Mbarrels/day and an allowable level of
about 27.0 Mbarrels/day. By 1985, the corresponding figures are projected at
23.4, 30.7, and 27.2 Mbarrels/day respectively, assuming that Iran and Iraq re-
enter the world oil market in the next couple of years. Some time after mid-
decade, however, OPEC oil export availability will begin to decline -- even with
these two key countries producing at peak levels -- as sustainable capacities
begin to fall in some countries while, at the same time, domestic oil
consumption continues to rise throughout OPEC.
tinder the base-case scenarios for allowable and domestic consumption
developed above, export availability (Table 4) is projected to decrease over the
course of the decade in every OPEC country with the notable exception of four:
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. The decline in export avail-
ability between 1982 and 1990 will be the most dramatic in five countries: Saudi
Arabia (down by 0.67 Mbarrels/day), Algeria (0.44), Venezuela (0.44), Indonesia
(0.37), and Migeria (0.25).
Thus, by 1990, OPEC oil export availability will total only 25.0 Mbarrels/
day out of an aggregate sustainable capacity of 33.5 Mbarrels/day and an allow-
able level of 29.8 Mbarrels/day.
What is perhaps an even more important feature of this scenario is the
composition of export availability or the increasing concentration of supply in
the Persian Gulf region generally, and in particular within three countries
whose future political configuration -- and hence oil supply and pricing poli-
cies -- are most uncertain: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. Together these coun-
tries will account for 14.5 Mbarrels/day or 58% of OPEC's total oil export avai-
lability by 1990 in the base case projection (against 52% in 1982 and 54% in
1985).
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Tle 4. Projected OPEC oil export availthility to 1990
(.illion barrels daily)
This shifting focus of OPEC oil export availability to the Persian Gulf
has far-reaching implications for the stability of world oil supplies and,
consequently, for world oil prices. Politically, the Persian Gulf region is
among the most volatile in the world; its countries are not only prone to inter-
nal upheaval but also to external threats of aggression. The inherent instabil-
ity of this region has been further compounded by the pressure of world reliance
on its oil.
The oil problem thus remainS the same. It is the threat of political
upheaval in the Persian Gulf that translates into 8upply interruptions and
economic chaos. The later any supply disruption occurs, the greater its impact
on oil prices; the world oil market will become increasingly tight with each
passing year as OPEC oil export availability continues to taper off.
1982 1985 1990
Saudi Arabia 8.20 7.73 7.53
Iran 2.50 2.74 3.97
Iraq 1.77 2.12 3.01
Kuwait 1.37 1.36 1.64
United Arab Emirates 1.40 1.39 1.79
Qatar 0.59 0.54 0.49
Persian Gulf 15.8) 15.88 18.43
Nigeria 1.99 1.87 1.74
Libya 1.90 1.87 1.83
Algeria 0.87 0.76 0.53
Gabon 0.17 0.16 0.15
Africa 4.93 4.66 4.25
Venezuela 1.88 1.77 1.54
Ecuador 0.17 0.15 0.05
Latin America 2.05 1.92 1.59
Indonesia 1.13 0.98 0.76
TOTAL OPEC 23.94 23.44 25.03
